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PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC DIALOGUE IN BENIN
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3The people are intelligent and have centuries of experience. Draw out their strength.
Listen to them.
-Xavier Institute, 1980:11
This interpretive research project explores the issue of participatory
communication (Jacobson & Servaes, 1999) within the particular Beninese context
of public dialogue (Buber, 1923, 1970; Cissna & Anderson, 2002, 2004; Spano,
2001). To assist the interpretation, the combined reading of the two literatures of
participatory communication and public dialogue results in the framing of the
metaphor of “participatory public dialogue” applied to the historic National
Conference of February, 19-28, 1990, the famous public dialogue that initiated the
democratization underway in Benin (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994;
Adamon, 1995).  With “participatory public dialogue” as a guiding metaphor,
and the National Conference as a case study, the research interprets the
communicative praxis (Schrag, 1989) of the participants in public dialogue
(Buber, 1923; Deetz, 1999 see also Gadamer, 1975) and focuses particularly on the
intellectual elite. The interpretation makes the case that in spite of its democratic
peaceful transition considered on the continent as a laboratory of political
transition (Banégas, 2003), Benin is a case of a culture of silence (Freire, 2000)
where the privileged small minority of intellectual elite locally called Akowé
(Vittin, 1989; Banégas, 2003) play a role of communicative silencers. That is, their
4communicative participation in the nation’s dialogic life (Flecha & al. 2003)
consists of a communicative praxis of “systematically distorted communication”
(Habermas, 1974; Deetz, 1992, 1999, 2004) that silences the illiterate and
underprivileged majority and disqualify them from democratic participation
while strengthening the culture of silence.
The thesis of the research emerges from this interpretation of the
communicative life of this West African nation. This dissertation claims that
through unreflective practices, the Akowé (intellectual) elite have silenced
persons, communities and the external world (Deetz, 1999). From a reflective
reading of their unreflective practice framed within a model of participatory
public dialogue emerges an ethical responsibility to become a “responsive I” and
a “communicative listener” of the ”silenced communities.” The metaphor of
“responsive I” (Arnett, 2004) operates a major change of orientation for the
“communicative silencer” by placing on the privileged “I” an ethical call to
become a “responsive I,” that is, “my brother’s keeper” (Levinas, 1999). The
“responsive I” (Arnett, 2004) underscores a preeminence of responsiveness over
the “egocentric autonomous subjectivity” (Burggraeve, 2002, 50). Conjointly, the
metaphor of “communicative listener” frames a communicative ethical call for
the “responsive I.” As a “communicative listener” the “responsive I” gives
preeminence to listening over telling (Fiumara, 2002; Pinchevski, 2001) and
5contributes to “participatory public dialogue” by listening to the “silenced
communities.” This dissertation suggests then that democratization requires that
“communicative silencers” hear the interpretive call to become “responsive
listeners.”
The dissertation concentrates on the particular local experience of Benin
with a specific focus on the historic “National Conference,” locally known as “La
Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation,” held in Cotonou (Benin) on February
19-28, 1990 (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994; Adamon, 1995). The research
takes the “National Conference” as a case study of public dialogue because in the
popular conscience of the Beninese people, the “National Conference” represents
the wellspring of the democratic experience (Adamon, 1995 and Banegas, 2003).
The research is locally situated and by the same token, the overall argument in
the dissertation is set as a disagreement with some modern aspects of liberal
democracies and modernization.
For these reasons, the research presumes and relies on the
democratization process underway in Benin, and the aim of the general
introduction to the entire research consists in making explicit this presumption.
The introduction proceeds as follows: after briefly discussing the ongoing
democratization in Benin, the introduction argues that this interpretive research
finds its significance in its communicative contribution to the strengthening of
6the young democracy, and finally, the introduction reviews the argument of each
chapter.
7GENERAL INTRODUCTION: “DEMOCRATIZATION” IN BENIN
It is in the nature of democracy that is a process, not an end; an ongoing experiment, not
a set of fixed doctrines. Its ideals, unless we repossess them generation to generation,
fossilize and become little different from any other ideology. The ‘Open Society’ is a
society without closure, a society open to challenge and criticism. When a nation
announces ‘the work of democracy is finished!’ it is democracy that is finished. Under
these circumstances, anyone -any nation –wishing to reinvent democracy must proceed
with caution. To invent it takes patience and wisdom and depends on conditions that
change from one country to another and from one era to another.
Benjamin R. Barber, Three Challenges to Reinventing Democracy, 1996.
This work of an interpretive call to responsibility for the “communicative
silencers” to become “responsive listeners” of “silenced communities” intends to
strengthen democracy in everyday life for many in Benin through
communicative participation. Accordingly, this introduction situates the
dissertation within the social, political and historic context of Benin first and then
within the specific interpretive framework that guides the research.
I. Strengthening Democracy
The study takes place in, depends on, and aims at strengthening a fragile
democracy, sharing in Benjamin R. Barber’s (1996) conviction that to reinvent
democracy, “it takes patience and wisdom and depends on conditions that
change from one country to another and from one era to another.” In Africa,
scholars refer to this process of reinventing and strengthening democracy as
democratization (Ossebi, 1995). Benin is well involved in such an experience of
8democratization, and the fact that on the continent, the nation’s exemplary
democratic transition in 1990 has made it known as a “democratic laboratory”
(Banegas, 2003) does not make its democratization any easier.  Besides the fact of
its youth, Benin’s democracy is fragile in that it is personality-driven. That is,
democracy has not changed the postcolonial politics structured around “big
men,” based on “clientelism” and a rent system resulting from a lack of
institutionalization of power (35).
The interpretation of the limits of the democratic experience in Benin
(Banégas, 2003) and the interpretation of its dialogic possibilities indicate that the
historical moment is ripe for a daring call to responsibility. Previous historical
periods in the life of the nation did not provide a context for heeding such a call.
After the independence from France in August 1, 1960, the nation then called
Dahomey experienced 12 years of social and political instability. At the rate of a
coup d’état almost every other year with weapons sounding louder than the
logic of reason and the voice of conscience, the time was not ready for the few
Europeanized intellectuals called “Evolués” in French and “Akowé” in the local
languages to hear a call of their ethical responsibility in the communicative life of
the nation. On October 26, 1972, a last coup d’état led by Matthieu Kérékou
turned Dahomey into a socialist and militarist dictatorship and the name of the
nation changed into Benin. For 17 years, a few revolutionaries and dignitaries of
9the unique party of PRPB (Revolutionary and Popular Party of Benin) exploited,
oppressed, imprisoned and killed the people and squandered the resources of
the land. Back then, it would have appeared naïve to address an interpretive call
to revolutionary dignitaries to become “responsive listeners” of the “silenced
communities.” Yet, against all odds and expectations, a highly surprising “public
dialogue” called “National Conference” initiated in 1990 a peaceful transition
from dictatorship to democracy. Since then, Benin has been experimenting with
democracy through a constitutional framework, representative institutions and
regular elections. Still, in the life of a nation, 14 years of democratic experience is
young. If industrialized nations are still learning democracy after two to three
centuries, it is necessary all the more for a young democracy to work at becoming
stronger. The research situates itself in this fragile and young democratic
environment and its significance is in its connection with this fragile democracy.
From Benin’s local historical perspective, the collective conscience, aided
by the experience of the past, possesses the available resources to understand
and distinguish between solving social and political crises with coup d’état,
firearms and revolutions on the one hand and peaceful transition and democratic
public dialogue on the other hand. If any historical moment allows for a call to
responsibility, it is the historical moment of democratization begun peacefully
yet painfully as the people agreed to talk to one another during the nine-day
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historic conference. The significance of this research is to offer, through
interpretive readings, appropriate metaphors to help understand that
democratization, particularly from a point of view situated within a
communicative praxis orientation to participatory public dialogue, depends on
the quality of participation of many, if not all, in the very midst of undeniable
diversities and differences.
Although the National Conference is a major political invention (Eboussi
Boulaga, 1993) and a historic achievement, as a one-time national dialogue, the
Conference is just a start of the “democratic renewal.” Everyday public dialogue
with broad participation is necessary to assure the viability of the democratic
society. The episodic democratic elections that Benin has organized with fair
success since 1990 are noticeable accomplishments. Yet a meaningful democracy
(Barber, 1989 & 1996) requires a continuously participative society. In every
democracy, professional politicians, experts and elites play a leading role in
formal discourse, public procedures and official decisions. Still, their legitimacy
depends on their capacity to listen responsively to the people. Consequently, this
research offers an interpretative invitation to the intellectual elite to listen to the
“silenced communities.” The research gathers impulses mainly from Buber’s
phenomenological anthropology, Freire’s humanism and Levinas’s
phenomenology to offer a set of interpretive metaphors including responsibility
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(Levinas, 1998, 1999), listening (Fiumara, 2002), participation, culture of silence
(Freire, 2000), communicative praxis (Schrag, 1989), “between,” dialogue (Buber,
1963, 1965, 1996) and public dialogue (Cissna & Anderson, 2002, 2004). With the
help of these concepts, this interpretation frames the following metaphors:
communicative silencer, responsive listener and participatory public dialogue.
The hope is to offer an interpretation of communication that compensates for the
shortcomings of modern liberal democracies (Mouffe, 2000) and modernization
projects, which hold the right of the individual to the detriment of “what holds
society together” (Anderson et al., 1996) and favor juridical, institutional and
technical vocabulary and the expressive power of language to the detriment of
the its listening dimension, that is, the “other side of language” (Fiumara, 2002).
II. Interpretive Listening
The research adopts an interpretive framework that resists the fashionable
cynical tendency of blaming all the evils of Benin, and for that matter of Africa
on the intellectuals (Bayart et al., 1999; Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Without giving
into the despair of “afro-pessimism” that gives up on hope, without succumbing
to the temptation of “nativism” (Said, 1993a) that falls back on a romanticized
tradition, the research assists and incites the silenced-silencer Akowé (intellectual)
elite to argue dialogically with the “dominant society,” particularly on ways of
thinking and acting about issues of broad participation and participatory
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communication (Jacobson & Servaes, 1999) in a liberal modern democracy
(Mouffe, 2000). For this reason, the dissertation is a hermeneutic endeavor that
invites the Akowé (intellectual) elite for an interpretive journey with thinkers
whose work and life have engaged Western heritage in a “corrective
conversation” (Arnett, 2004, 81). In addition to the insights on dialogue and
participation coming from Paulo Freire (1997, 2000, 2001, 2002), who himself
belonged to a “dependent society,” the research interprets  the dialogic
philosophy of Martin Buber (1996), the ethics of responsibility of Emmanuel
Levinas (1998) and the philosophy of listening of Gemma Fiumara (2002).
Consequently, the research adopts as a method a "hermeneutical thinking
through" (Serequeberan, 1994) of the lived communicative experience of the
Akowé elite, a “man captivated by dogmas” (Gadamer, 1975), the dogmas of
westernization and modernization. In the Third World post-colonial condition of
“a culture of silence” (Freire, 2000), the interpretation calls the intellectual elite
described as a communicative silencer to become an “experienced man” (Gadamer,
1975), that is, communicatively a responsive listener of and to the silenced
communities and the historical moment. This hermeneutic reading of lived
experience inspires the Akowé elite to find words that help better name and
transform his world (Freire, 2000). A project of Conscientizao (Freire, 2002) or
hermeneutic consciousness (Gadamer, 1975) as it is, the method is enriched by
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Buber's philosophical anthropology of dialogue able to describe and prescribe
(Stewart & Zedker, 2000) not the agency of the intellectual or his psychology, but
his “life of dialogue” (Friedman, 1960) as sensitive to the "between" (Buber, 1963)
and engaged in a communicative praxis that distinguishes the ethics of
responsibility (Levinas, 1998) and the philosophy of listening (Fiumara, 2002)
from the egocentric "effort to be" (Levinas) of Western philosophy. As such the
framework of this anthropological philosophy of dialogue is a “hermeneutics
[that] is prepared to wed itself to the discipline of listening” (Fiumara, 2002, 30).
This is a crucial methodological point that needs further comment.
In The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening, Gemma C. Fiumara
(2002) conceives of this hermeneutics wedded to the “discipline of listening” by
contrasting it with traditional Western epistemology. The tradition of Western
thought she charges, in a tone comparable to Levinas, is a “logocentric system of
culture” (18) with a conception of “divided logos,” that is, an excessive
fascination with “saying” to the point that “listening,” the other side of language,
has now “become too alienated from the assertive tradition of saying” (9).
Fiumara goes on to discuss the domination, colonization and arrogance of the
logocentric culture framing “the entire world” as its “celebrated science-power
equation is revealed in the coincidence of technological development and social-
political hegemony” (19). In this logocentric culture spread worldwide in which
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Benin is relegated to “a culture of silence,” epistemology is centered on a
rationality that “surreptitiously absorbs all knowledge claims with the ultimate
result of silencing any ‘illogical’ voice that might be heard in the course of the
debate and which might create links that we regard as unnecessary” (45).
Contrary to this “logocratic terrorism” (45) of “a non-listening language”
(47), “interpretive listening” (42) goes beyond epistemological “’conflagration’ or
‘raging fires’ of ‘pride’” (45); it goes beyond the analytical detachment that splits
the individual, in occurrence the intellectual elite, who knows from the one who
lives; it goes beyond academic elaborations that have “the tendency to become an
end unto themselves, to forget the extent to which they are interwoven with the
development of the human condition, and to branch out into increasingly
defined and watertight compartments” (46). Interpretive listening “impoverishes
us from a ‘rational’ point of view because if we seriously engage in paying heed
we may even come to a state of helplessness and disorientation. To the power of
epistemological tools accounting for what is familiar and mimetically
reproducing discourse in accordance with certain basic meta-rules, interpretive
listening responds with the strength to cultivate “the habit of paying heed to
formerly unheard-of messages, voices, clues” (42).
Levinas’s project of interpreting Otherwise than Being that formulates for
the “privileged I” a radical responsibility for the Other (1998, 96) belongs to those
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“formerly unheard-of messages.” As a communicative articulation of this
Levinasian responsibility-for-the-other, the current research seeks to interpret not
the saying of the Akowé elite about participatory communication but the
unfamiliar clues of his listening. On such unusual turf of the communicator
becoming the listener of the silenced communities, the research resorts to
interpretive listening precisely because “we assume a hermeneutic position when
we do not completely understand the experience that we are faced by” (42).
Throughout the five following chapters of the dissertation assumes that
hermeneutic position.
For everyday democratization to foster broad participation (chapter 1) and
public dialogue (chapter 2) within the dialogic society of Benin (chapter 3), the
social subjects of Akowé (intellectuals) have the ethical responsibility to become
aware of the fact that their hegemonic control of monologic participation turns
them into communicative silencers precluding the emergence of the voices of the
illiterate and underprivileged majority of the culture of silence (chapter 4). The
last chapter advances the claim that the consolidation of the democratization
process in Benin requires that this awareness be followed by a double change of
orientation: from the privileged “I” to the responsive “I” and from the monologic
speaker that strengthens the culture of silence to the “communicative listener”
that encourages dialogic participation. As a whole the interpretation listens to the
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clues to first reach a critical awareness of the intellectual elite as communicative




PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION AND THE POWER ELITE
The needles, targets, and audiences of communication and development models combined
with self-righteousness, titles, and insecurities, perhaps sprinkled with a dash of
misdirected benevolence, often renders “experts” a bit too verbose and pushy. Perhaps
this is because it requires much more imagination, preparation, and hard work to have
dialogical learning. It is far easier to prepare and give lectures. However, there is possibly
a valid reason why we have two ears, but only one mouth. Communication between
people thrives not on the ability to talk fast, but the ability to listen well. People are
voiceless not because they have nothing to say, but because nobody cares to listen to
them.
Servaes & Arnst, Participatory Communication Research
The literature of participatory communication (Jacobson & Servaes, 1999)
is an undertaking of professionals of communication and experts of development
who critique their own silencing power in order to foster the participation of the
“silenced communities” (Freire, 2000) . Chapter one relies on this scholarship to
unveil what participatory communication reveals about the power elite in the
communicative life of the democratization underway in Benin. A set of
metaphors such as participation, participatory communication, “monologic
participation” and “dialogic participation” points to the significance of the issue
of participation in communication. The chapter makes the case that in a
democratic context, “elitist democrats,” professionals and experts have the
silencing power to mask their “monologic participation.” Without denying the
significance of democratic representation and the existence of inequality of
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power and expertise, “dialogic participation” assures that the broad participation
of all social subjects contributes to strengthen democracy and produce
sustainable social changes. The chapter defines different types of participation
that inform the specific focus of the research on participatory communication.
I. Participation
Participation refers to a variety of social processes occurring in different
contexts, including development projects (Tandon, 2002), democratic institutions
(Nylen, 2003) policy planning (Schmalz-Burns, 2002), research methods (Servaes
& Arnst, 1999) and communication practices (Jacobson & Servaes, 1999). Not
only does the concept generate various theoretical developments and practical
applications, but it also aims at diverse objectives. To some scholars,
participation is a means to reach a certain goal, that is, the process of involving
participants in order to assure the success of a common action. To other
researchers, participation is an end in itself (Servaes, 1996, 15). It is little wonder,
then, that scholars diverge widely on the definition of the concept. Shirley White
(1994) captures the existing diversity of applications, goals and definitions of
participation when she describes it as a kaleidoscopic concept that changes colors
and shapes. This kaleidoscopic concept resists “the eagerness for labels and
encapsulated definitions” (Gumicio, 2000, 8). The dissertation embraces the
complexity of the idea of participation while focusing on the communicative
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dimension of the concept. Concretely, this translates into a four-part discussion
of participation that balances texture with focus. The first part offers Paulo
Freire’s definition of participation. Then the three following parts discuss the
application of participation to the context of democracy, development and
decision-making. Carrying on the insights developed at this point, the fourth
part focuses on participatory communication.
A. Paulo Freire and Participation
Freire’s understanding of participation brings forth the importance of
social and historical subjects. Second, under his view the issue of participation
marks a disagreement with modern democracy (Mouffe, 2000) and
modernization projects (Moemeka, 2000). And third, Freire indicates the limits of
the concept. In the foreword to Participatory Communication (White, Nair &
Ascroft, 1994), Freire defines participation as a “basis for democracy” (12).
Participation considers men and women as social beings, historical subjects with
diverse interests, opinions, and wills, who have the “right and the power to
intervene in the social order and change it through political praxis” (12). Freire
(1994) situates his discussion of participation within the knowledge of serious
disagreement with some aspects of liberal democracies and modernization that
threaten both “developed” and “developing” nations by changing historical
subjects into subjugated objects. For him, participation is an existential theme
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that challenges the tendency of modernization to dehumanize men and women
with “the technical and administrative rationality of market, capital, and private
property” (12). Conceptualizing men and women as social beings and historical
subjects, participation questions the “success” of liberal democracy and
modernization achieved at "the expense of the values historically won by
mankind, such as sovereignty of men and women over things, the self-
government of society, the human ability to transform existing reality and to
create a new one” (12).
All the while, Freire warns that if liberal democracy and modernization
have their limits, participation is not a panacea either (13) Theory and practice
must constantly infuse and temper participation with the reality of local soil to
improve the feasibility of participation as “an organic ingredient of democracy”
(Freire, 1994, 13). The applications of Freire’s ideas of participation have
generated numerous theoretical elaborations and practical initiatives such as
participatory research (Tandon, 2002), participatory development (Chamber,
1997), participatory democracy (Barber, 1984; Nylen, 2003), participatory
decision-making (Heinelt et al., 2002) and participatory communication
(Jacobson & Servaes, 1999). The latter application of participatory
communication constitutes the focus of the current research project. In order to
provide the research with a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973) of participation, the
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following three sections illustrate and expand upon Freire’s definition in three
consecutive applications of the concept including participatory democracy,
participatory development and participatory decision-making. For each type of
participation, the discussion indicates the significance for participatory
communication leading to a last section squarely focused on participatory
communication.
B. “Elitist Democrat” and Participation
The literature of participatory democracy reveals that participation helps
challenge the hegemony of elites in democratic contexts. First, the section
introduces the concepts of “thin democracy” and “elitist democracy,” and
second, the section describes the alternative that participatory democracy
represents. The third point develops between language and participatory
democracy, a connection that will later prove helpful in understanding
participatory communication.
Participatory democracy represents a set of democratic ideas and practices
that emerged from the late 20th century as a promising alternative to “thin
democracies” (Barber, 1984). In “thin democracy,” the responsibility of
advancing public goods rests in the hands of elected representatives, technical
experts and news media, while public political participation is practically
reduced to going to the polls to vote and answering opinion surveys (Spano,
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2001). The thinness of democracy is only a particular manifestation of the
paradoxes of modern liberal democracy (Mouffe, 2000) against the grain of
which Freire understands the importance of participation. Nylen (2003) describes
a kind of thin democratic system particularly insightful for the current research:
“elitist democracy.” In elitist democracy, various elite groups compete “for the
prize of ‘taking over’ the State or portions of it, offering clientelistic bargains –
patronage in return for support –to other networks of political and economic
elites and to organized nonelites (e.g. urban labor), while strictly forbidding
autonomous social movement or political representation outside of elite-
dominated party machines and State-run organizations” (Nylen, 2003, 16). Nylen
gives some illustrations of elitist, thin democracies from both the American and
Brazilian societies. Similarly, Bierschenk and Sardan (2003) offer strong support
for their claim that in Benin, clientelism, patronage and elitism continue to stifle
the participation of the non-elite in political process.
Contrary to these thin and elitist democracies, participatory democracy
works with the conviction that “citizens should govern themselves at least in
some public matters at least some of the time” (Spano, 2001, 26). Participatory
democracy is a “strong democracy” inasmuch as it favors public judgment, what
Barber calls “public seeing,” by developing “a form of political consciousness
that will enlarge the understanding and the sympathies of interest-motivated
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individuals and transform them into citizens capable of reassessing themselves
and their interests in terms of the newly invented communal norms and newly
imagined public goods” (173). Participatory democracy envisions politics “as a
way of living – as, namely, the way that human beings with variable but
malleable natures and with competing but overlapping interests can contrive to
live together communally not only to their mutual advantage but also the
advantage of their mutuality” (Barber, 1984, 118). In search for mutuality and
participation for the many if not for all, participatory democracy is not exactly an
alternative, but “a complementary set of inclusionary institutional reforms that
could help harness the 'social capital' inherent in citizens politics everywhere
and, thereby, revive some of contemporary democracy’s lost luster” (Nylen,
2003, 12).
To this end, participatory democracy has a stance on political language
that is particularly interesting for this research. Barber (1984) explains that
“through participatory deliberation and ongoing public talk [language] contrives
to define and redefine the crucial terms that we use in turn to define and redefine
our lives” (157). Barber explains that participatory democracy combines “public
seeing” and public talking in a way that balances adversary politics and
deliberation by nourishing “the mutualistic art of listening.” While “liberal
democrats tend to value speech,” to the detriment of listening, the “strong
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democrat” (175), that is, the participatory democrat, “will strain to hear what
makes us alike [and] will listen for a common rhetoric evocative of a common
purpose or a common good,” without losing sight of the undeniable differences
(175). In his political communication, the participatory democrat is an empathetic
listener who “becomes more like his interlocutor as the two bridge the
differences between them by conversation and mutual understanding” (175).
In sum, the above discussion of participatory democracy contains the
insights to help see participatory communication as a communicative alternative
to “thin democracy,” “elitist democracy,” clientelism, patronage and bargain.
The strength of participatory communication depends on its capacity to favor
“public seeing,” public talking and the “mutualistic art of listening” amidst
diversities and differences. Participatory development and participatory
decision-making have additional insights to bring into understanding
participatory communication.
C. Professionals of Development and Participation
This section has two significant reasons to recall the articulation of the
concept of participation in the context of development. In addition to showing
another dimension of the kaleidoscopic nature of the concept of participation, the
writings on participatory development have demonstrated an ironic
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contradiction in the project of participation itself. This ironic contradiction
remains a critical reminder for the current investigation as a whole.
First, in its kaleidoscopic nature, the concept of participation has helped
development scholars address some important shortcomings of their projects for
social change.  In the context of development, the concept of participation has
emerged, beginning slowly in the 1980’s, as a solution to the ineffectiveness of
externally imposed, donor-driven, expert-oriented and top-down forms of
researches and projects for social change (Chambers, 1983, 1992, 1994a, b, c, 1997;
Tandon, 2002; World Bank, 1994). “The broad aim of participatory development
is to increase the involvement of socially and economically marginalized peoples
in decision-making over their own lives” (Guijt, 1998, 1). To this end,
participatory development considers as central to development projects not the
donor’s or the outsider’s mandate, but the knowledge, perspectives, skills and
priorities of the people whose lives are affected by development interventions.
But then again, who has the power to claim that the participation of the people is
crucial in development process? The participatory development literature has
pondered the question and has pointed to an ironic contradiction plaguing the
honorable search for participation.
This ironic contradiction constitutes the second point that the current
research retains about participatory development. That is, the people do not have
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the power to articulate their own right to participation – experts have that power
on their behalf. Scholars have remarked that in their applications of the ideas of
participatory development, development professionals “are actually still
engaged in the construction of a particular reality – one that at root is amenable
to, and justifies, their existence and intervention within it” (Cooke & Kothari,
2001, 15). The ability of academics and practitioners to sustain the participatory
development discourse is indicative of the power they possess. This line of
thinking has led Chambers (1997) to ask ironically, ‘Whose reality counts?’
Warning that often, the reality of the people only counts as a pretext for further
domination by experts and donors, Cooke & Kothari (2001) and their
collaborators entitled their edited volume with the provocative question:
“Participation: The New Tyranny?” Pushing the critical questioning to an
extreme in a deconstructive framework, and working out of a slightly different
scholarly context, the post-colonialist scholar Spivak has asked: “Can the
subaltern speak?” (). She goes on to argue that “any discussion of subaltern
consciousness is always inter-mediated by scholars who can never know the
subaltern, and hence the latter cannot speak” (Mohan, 2001, 157). In her essay,
Spivak destabilizes textual representations and posits the “Third World Woman”
as a signifier who has no position of enunciation and is unable to represent
herself.
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This research considers seriously the above questions. However, the
research disagrees with Spivak’s position, which offers critique but no solution.
In addition to its political deficiency, Spivak’s argument is self-defeating because
of her assumption on the exclusively expressive nature of language, logos and
rationality to the detriment of “the other side of language” – the listening side
(Fiumara, 2002). It should come as no surprise that in the horizon of Spivak’s
argument, there is no room for listening.
The current research addresses participation’s ironic contradiction, which
inspires in some case a self-defeating deconstructive critique. The research is
mindful that participation can become a pretext for disguised or overt tyranny.
Still, the research maintains that participation is worth pursuing. From a
communication perspective, the ironic contradiction can be addressed by
recalling the ethical duty that privileged elites have to listen to the “subaltern”
and the “Third World Woman” who constitute along with other marginalized
and underprivileged those described by this research as the “silenced
communities.” The research does not ask: “Can the silenced community speak?”
The research begins with the assumption that by their very existence, the
“silenced communities” are already speaking no matter how compromised are
their position of enunciation and their capacity of self-representation are.
Consequently, this research raises and addresses the following question: Can the
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elites, professionals, experts and others who already have a position of
enunciation listen to the “silenced communities”? One final application of
participation discusses the concept in the context of decision-making and helps
bring forth the practical importance of participation.
D. Experts in Policy-Making and Participation
Similarly with participatory democracy and participatory development,
participatory decision making demonstrates that the effectiveness and
sustainability of policies depend less on the mandate of professional policy
makers than on the participation of those whose lives will be affected.
Heinelt et al. (2002) define participation as “a means to legitimize the
decision-making procedure” in order to produce “better results.” This is the case
for at least two reasons: participation is a democratic right and a practical means
for better outcomes. First, participation results from the natural rights of the
citizens in democracy. “Those who are affected by a decision also have to be
given a right to participate in the decision” (Heinelt, 2002, 17-18). Second, “those
who are given the right to participate might have the relevant knowledge to help
produce better results,” because through their involvement, they might have the
potential for innovation, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of policies
(Schmalz-Burns, 2002, 59). Admittedly, the noble goal of participation is difficult
to translate into reality. Yet, as a legal right of citizens and a practical means for
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sustainability, participation becomes necessary for “curing the structural short-
comings of representative institutions” in democratic decision makings (59).
To those who tend to believe that the discussions of participatory decision
making and participatory development are reduced to the context of developing
nations, it may come as a surprise that Heinelt et al. (2002) are working in the
context of the European Union.  Still, this research quotes their contributions for
an even better reason. They argue for participatory policy making in the complex
system of the emerging European Union because of its “dispersion,
polycentricity and fragmentation” (59). For sure, from the point of view of scale,
the European Union is almost a whole continent, while Benin is just a small
nation. Yet, Benin and its 6.7 million people (INSAE, 2002) have their share of
dispersion and fragmentation due for example to the existence of more than 110
political parties, more than 9 different categories of ethnic groups and languages
(INSAE, 2002), not to mention the strained relations between Western influences
and local worldviews. The existence of representative institutions and
democratic legality in Benin is a good start that guarantees at least in theory the
right to participatory decision and policy-making for all.
The young democracy has felt very quickly the need of “curing the
structural short-comings of representative institutions” by seeking through the
process of decentralization ways of providing local collectivities with “more
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freedom” and “more democracy” (Laleye, 2003, 48). In Economie et Société: d’Hier
à Demain, [Economy and Society: from Yesterday to Tomorrow], a collection of
articles edited by Hountondji (2000), a number of authors have demonstrated
that the inefficacity of economic policies from 1960 to 1989 has not changed in the
years following the 1990 adoption of neo-liberalist economy and democracy.
These authors are calling for the development of a culture of solidarity based on
ever broader consensus and participation, a stronger collective conscience and
public ethics (254-255). Following in their steps, the interest of this research in
participatory communication is to recall along with participatory decision-
making that the effectiveness, innovativeness, and sustainability of projects for
social transformation depend on the quality of participation of all citizens. In the
U.S., in Brazil, in the European Union, in Benin or anywhere else, experts can
design and decide the best projects with professional standards, but the lack of
participation of those whose life will be affected compromises the efficiency and
sustainability of social transformations.
At this point of the discussion, participation emerges as a kaleidoscopic
concept with texture facilitating a deep description of participatory
communication. As a communicative dimension of participation, the following
interpretation of participatory communication retains from Paulo Freire (1994)
that participation does not posit the participant as a reified agency or
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psychological subject. Participants are retrieved from the dehumanizing forces of
modernization and modern democracy to enjoy their right and power to
intervene in the social order as social beings and historical subjects. The quality
of a communicative interpretation of participation will depend on its capacity to
maintain this disagreement of participation with modernity. While modern
democracies tend to produce “thin democracies” and “elitist democracies” with
clientelism and bargain systems controlled by elected representatives, technical
experts and professional of news media, while modernization theory tends to
engender top-down development projects and take participation as a pretext for
tyranny, participation can still call on social subjects to develop “public seeing,”
public talking, the “mutualistic art of listening” (Barber, 1984) for the very sake
of sustainability.
To focus now on the communicative application of participation, the
insights gleaned so far help distinguish two metaphors: “monologic
participation” and “dialogic participation.” The “monologic participation”
represents from a communication point of view the distortion of participation by
modern democracies and modernization, whereas “dialogic participation”




So far, the discussions highlight the importance of participation in making
democracy strong, development sustainable and policy-making efficient. The
insights gleaned from these different applications prepare the chapter to focus on
the concept of participatory communication, which is the development of the
concept of participation in communication. The section proceeds as follows: after
a discussing the definitions of participatory communication, the section offers a
distinction between “monologic participation” and “dialogic participation”
within participatory cocmmunication.
A. Definition of Participatory Communication
Similarly to participation, participatory communication counts a
multiplicity of applications. In Making Waves, Gumucio (2001) has documented
50 cases of African, Latin American and Asian countries experimenting with
participatory communication in projects as diverse as community radio;
participatory video; popular theater, puppets and dance; community internet
centers and village phones. These projects share common preoccupations equally
captured by the terms participation and communication. “Communication and
participation are actually two words sharing the same concept. Etymologically
the Latin communio relates to participation and sharing” (Gumucio, 2001, 33).
The combination of these two etymologically redundant terms serves to put into
focus the central preoccupations of participatory communication. This research
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project is particularly interested in building on the capacity of participatory
communication to challenge modern conceptions and practices of
communication, which lose sight of the idea of sharing in communication and
tend to conceive of participation as a monologic process controlled by the elites,
the experts, the professionals and the intellectuals.  Throughout this entire work
the concepts of participation and participatory communication refer to this idea
of sharing.
This section on participatory communication organizes the challenges and
the hopes in this idea of sharing around two consecutives metaphors:
“monologic participation” and “dialogic participation.” The option of looking at
participatory communication with the qualifiers of “monologic” and “dialogic”
is ironic in the first case and redundant in the second case. “Monologic
participation” indicates from a communication point of view the ironic
contradiction in some modern conceptions of communication that claim to be
participatory while being monologic and hegemonic. “Dialogic participation”
makes emphatically explicit the dialogic nature of participation and participatory
communication and points at the crucial role of dialogue in democracy. The
discussion that follows distinguishes successively “monologic participation” and
“dialogic participation” in participatory communication.
A. Monologic Participation
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The metaphor of “monologic participation” describes the limits of modern
conceptions of participatory communication and points at the call for a genuinely
“dialogic participation.” The interpretation of “monologic participation”
suggested here distinguishes as its existential context the metaphor of “culture of
silence” or “world of silence,” as its dominant concept the idea of modernization,
and as its communicative illustrations some modern communication theories
centered around effective transmission.  The argument developed here does not
reject the importance and value of monologue in human life; Buber
acknowledges that not all of life is dialogic, and monologue, as well as technical
dialogue, is, at times, appropriate. For this project, the assumption remains that
when practices move too far toward the monologic side of the narrow ridge, a
corrective is needed, particularly in developing democracies. Monologue, even in
such contexts, will still have a place, but should not be the only mode of
discourse. Even more to the point, this reject assumes that participation requires
multiple participants taking part dialogically in a project greater than each
individual participant. Therefore, if monologue is useful sometimes, it has no
place in situations of participation. The suggested metaphor of monologic
participation points to a misunderstanding of participation or an inconsistency in
the practices of participation.
1. “Monologic participation” in “a world of silence”
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“Monologic participation” is the mode of participation in the existential
condition of the Third World that Freire (2000) describes communicatively as “a
world of silence.” According to Freire (2000), the Third-World “being a world of
silence [it] is still unable – not because of any ’ontological‘ incapacity, for such a
thing does not exist – to assume the posture of one who ‘has a voice,’ of one who
is the subject of his choices, of one who freely projects his destiny” (2000, 11).
After World War II, nations and nationals in sub-Saharan Africa have gained the
status of independence from their colonizers. Yet they have not assumed the
posture of subjects who have their own voice, make their own choice and project
their own destiny. They are still part of the Third World, a “world of silence”
(Freire, op. cit.) dependent on modernization models that understand
communicative experience as “effective transmission” (Deetz, 1999), “diffusion
of innovations” (Rogers, 1983); “technological transfer” (Schramm, 1964) and
strategic manipulation (Habermas, 1984). This research project is particularly
interested in the connection between the silencing practices of transmission and
the Third-World condition of pseudo-participation. A brief discussion of
modernization would be helpful to understand the roots and the extent of the
problem of effective transmission creating pseudo-participation in a “world of
silence.”
2. “Monologic participation” and modernization
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“Monologic participation” and its existential context of emergence which
is a “world of silence” are both products of the modernization project. In the
Third-World countries like Benin, the post-war and post-colonial period proved
to be a time of enthusiastic and imperialistic implementation of modernization
through development, liberal democracy and mass media. Truman’s “fair deal”
(1949) and the United Nations’ Measures for the Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries (1951) put into motion a modernization program
conceived as the westernization of the newly independent Third-World nations
(Moemeka, 2000). With the confidence coming from the success of the “Marshall
Plan” in rebuilding the World War II-devastated Europe, American scholars like
Lerner (1958) and Rogers (1962) applied the modernization model to developing
nations. This modernization consisted in the conviction that with ”the passing of
traditional society” (Lerner, op. cit.), the backwardness and the shadow of Africa
would be entirely replaced with Westernization.
In modernization, participation is a process beginning with “media
participation” and resulting in “political participation.” For modernization,
“media participation” is advertising campaigns affecting individual attitudes for
the purpose of effectively transmitting to developing countries the Western
vision and values of “psychic mobility,” “empathy,” urbanization, literacy, free
press and political participation. In turn, political participation refers to citizen
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participation in representative democracy and party processes, particularly
voting (Almond and Coleman, 1960; Pye and Verba, 1965) The dissenting voices
have done little to challenge modernization models. Talking about
modernization, observers still remark today that “it is extremely hard to escape
the feeling that we are still looking at the same old thoroughly sugar-coated
dominant paradigm now with participation rhetoric” (Ascroft and Masilela,
1994, 280). These modernization models compromise participation because they
lead to an instrumental conception of communication and a “technocratic
dissolution of the political dimension” of society with the expert replacing the
citizens and technical, scientific solutions taking the place of political decisions
(Barbero, 207). In the Third World, which is “a world of silence” (Freire, 2000),
participation is monologic because by virtue of modernization, experts and
professionals silence the citizens and scientific solutions to social problems
silence political decisions. In spite of criticisms and challenges, modernization
remains a dominant theory. It is now suitable to recall the main criticism of
modernization: dependency theory.
3. Monologic Participation and Dependency Theory
The first criticisms leveled at modernization models appeared initially in
studies of economic dependency. To emphasize the marginalization of the
majority of developing countries, scholars such as  Paul Baran (1954) and André
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Gunder Frank (1967) demonstrated that underdevelopment does not originate in
the backwardness of traditional societies as modernization theorists claim. To the
contrary, underdevelopment is the obverse side of development:
The capitalist countries had become “developed” by exploiting their
colonies for centuries. Such economic exploitation had left the colonies
with narrowly specialized, exported oriented primary production structure
managed by an elite which shared the cultural lifestyle and tastes of the
dominant classes in capitalist sates. This elite continues to perpetuate the
rule of ex-colonies; hence a kind of neo-imperialism still prevails.
(Kumar, 1994, 84)
Growing beyond the economic context, the essential contributions of
dependency theorists continue to appear in works like Culture and Imperialism
(Said, 1994), pointing at an enduring global system with the developed countries
at the center and the developing nations at the periphery (Frank, 1967). This
struggle against dependency is becoming more difficult as the direct
confrontation against a colonialist country with a geographically defined power
is shifting into “a struggle for identity within a transnational system that is
diffuse with complex forms of global interrelations and interpenetrations”
(Canclini quoted in Barbero, 1994). From the perspective of participation, an
international system of dependency disqualifies populations of developing
countries from having a voice, from being subjects of their own choices (Freire,
2000). In sum, with communicative practices of transferring or transmitting
Western values, modern technology, and liberal democracy to nominally
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independent African nations, the preoccupations with participation are nothing
more than monologic participation. In spite of the dependency challenges,
modernization remains a dominant paradigm with communicative practices of
control, diffusion and colonization (Deetz, 1999, 145). The literature offers
numerous examples of those communication models.
4. “Monologic participation” and communication theories
In Media and Mediation, Barbero (1994) lays out the critique of modern
communication theories that can only induce monologic participation. The first
group of examples of communication theories in this dominant modernization
theory barely affected by dependency theory consists of psychological and
behaviorist theories of mass media preoccupied with media effects (Katz E. &
Lazarsfeld P., 1955; Lasswell H.C., 1948; McCombs M.E., Shaw D.L., 1972). The
second type of examples includes semiotic and structuralist theories (Jacobson R.,
1963; Saussure F., 1979; Barthes R., 1957) preoccupied with codes and text
analysis that produce “meaning in a vacuum” because they erase social
contradictions and reduce “the processes of communication to something
immanent to the process” (Barbero, 204). The third set of examples are
information theories (Shannon & Weaver, 1945), so preoccupied with
fragmentation of communication, accumulation and classification of information
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that they fail to deal with “the issues of information as a process of collective
behaviour and the conflict of interests” (206).
The strength of these theories relies on their effectiveness in presenting
messages, transmitting information, diffusing innovations and analyzing texts.
But precisely, “to the extent that the external world or other person is silenced by
the success of placing one’s position,” (Deetz, 1999, 151) these theories
undermine the possibility of community participation “permanently built by all
therefore belonging to all” (Bordenave, 1994, 37). Participation becomes
monologic to the detriment of the external world or the other person who is
silenced. The strength of these theories of communication is to conceive of
systems of domination that place the power of decision-making under the
control of planners, administrators, and the elites. “The level of participation of
the people is that of being present to listen to what is being planned for them and
what would be done unto them – this is definitively nonparticipatory” (Shirley
White, 1994, 17), that is, monologic participation. Such a monologic participation
is at home in the “world of silence” (Freire, 2000) that constitutes in “continuing
conditions of silence of an illusory voice” (op. cit.). In contrast to
“communication effectiveness [that] is based primarily on reproductive fidelity”
(Deetz, 1999) and can only offer monologic participation, the metaphor of
“dialogic participation” functions in this research as a conceptual alternative to
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contemplate the possibility a communication based on mutual and dialogic
understanding, productive of new meaning, and supportive of participatory
democracy and decision-making.
B. Dialogic Participation
Dialogic participation represents an alternative to the communicative
focus of a modernization framework on effective transmission and monologic
participation. Dialogic participation is grounded in a dialogic approach to and
mutual understanding of communicative experience (Buber, 1970; Gadamer,
1975; Freire, 1970) that challenges a modern understanding of reality as
measurable, objective and destined to manipulation by value-free technology
and mechanistic transmission. In addition, dialogue has an understanding of
humanity different from the modern view. Dialogue confronts modernistic
conceptions of humanity as “an object, an entity formed by external forces, a
passive body that reacts to external stimuli and influences in a predictable
fashion” (Servaes, 1999, 20). Dialogue scholars such as Habermas, Gadamer,
Buber and Freire offer various inflections of the difference between modern,
monologic participatory communication and “dialogic participation.”
Within a dialogic framework, Habermas’ theory of communicative action
(1984, 1987) and Gadamer’s concept of mutual understanding (1975) distinguish
strategic uses of communication from a more basic communicative attempt to
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reach mutual understanding. Working from differing conceptions of the dialogic
process, they both emphasize the continual social formation of consensus in
interaction beyond the intentions and opinions of the participants. From his
point of view, Martin Buber, a leading voice among dialogue scholars,
distinguishes the I-It relation of technical dialogue from the I-Thou relation of
genuine dialogue. The I-It relation is impersonal and belong to a world to “be
used,” while the I-Thou is personal and belongs to a world to “be met,” a world
of encounter (Buber, 1958, 18). Freire (1970) subscribes to Buber’s theory of
dialogue and develops a theory that stigmatizes the “banking” education system
of modernistic transmission and suggests a pedagogy of dialogic
communication. With his concept of conscientization or critical awareness, he
highlights the importance of dialogue as a process of community development of
self-actuated and self-determining individuals.
These scholars represent various disagreements with modernistic
transmission and monologic participation. The current research relies on these
scholars to frame the metaphor of “dialogic participation.” The following
discussion concerns the meaning and the significance of “dialogic participation.”
The current research defines the metaphor of “dialogic participation” as a
participation not in an impersonal, modernistic “world of silence” (Freire, 2000)
with strategic manipulation (Habermas), but a participation in a personal world
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of encounter where the I and the Thou (Buber, 1970) are self-actuated and self-
determining historical subjects who work dialogically for community
development (Freire, 2000) through a continual social formation of experience in
an interaction that reaches beyond the intentions and opinions of the participants
(Gadamer, 1974). The conceptual significance of “dialogic participation” consists
in its capacity to pinpoint the dialogic requirement of participatory
communication and for the strengthening of democracy altogether. “Dialogic
participation” renews communicatively the hope of addressing the limits of
modern thin democracies (Barber, 1984). In these democratic conceptions, elitist
democrats, clientelistic representatives, and hegemonic experts turn participation
into disguised tyranny and masked monologue.  “Dialogic participation”
represents an insightful contrast with the elites’ monologic participation that
conceives the people as being passively “present to listen to what is being
planned for them and what would be done unto them” (Shirley White, 1994, 17).
“Dialogic participation” attempts to frame the move of the phenomenon from a
monologue in which the people have no say to a dialogue in which the people
and the elites become mutually I and Thou (Buber, 1970) or self-actuated and self-
determining social subjects (Freire, 1994, 2000) with the right and the capacity to
participate communicatively through speaking and listening in the community
development. “Dialogic participation” breaks with the “culture of silence”
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(Freire, 2000, 2002) and the community ceases to be silenced. As “dialogic
participation” clarifies the communicatively silencing practices of the elites and
technicians of goodness, it stresses the fact that for democracy to be strong
(Barber, 1984) and for development and public policy to be sustainable (), all
social subjects have the undeniable right and the indispensable role of
dialogically taking part in the “public seeing,” the public talking, the
“mutualistic art of listening” (Barber, 1984) and the collective action (Gumucio,
2001). That is, it belongs to all the members of the community to talk, listen and
act collectively for the betterment of society. The communicative stance of
“dialogic participation” is in stark contrast with that of “monologic
participation.”
The dialogue scholars quoted here complement each other in challenging
an orientation of communication (Carey, 1992) dominated by a non-participatory
transmission that the research calls “monologic participation.” The work of these
scholars contributes to show that the communicative problem of “monologic
participation” goes beyond the restriction of communication to an effective
transmission of information. The problem lies in the fact that a ’successful’
presentation of one’s own meaning can limit rather than aid productive
communication. “For to the extent that the external world or the other person is
silenced by the success of placing one’s position in place of conflict with
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alternatives” (Deetz,op. cit., 151) genuine participation is compromised. Which is
why Paulo Freire (2000) calls the Third World and some quarters of the
industrialized world a “world of silence,” rendered unable “to assume the
posture of one who ‘has a voice,’ of one who is the subject of his choices, of one
who freely projects his destiny” (2000, 11). In short, not only does “monologic
participation” conceive of communication as effective transmission of
information, but in addition it results in colonizing and silencing
communicatively the silenced community.
Quite to the contrary, thanks to dialogue, genuine participation allows
“the ongoing process of creating mutual understanding through the open
formation of experience” (Deetz, op. cit. 151). “Dialogic participation” represents
a communicative orientation that strengthens “commonness,” “communion,”
“community,” and “communication” (Carey, 1992) without excluding the need
for information sharing or I-It relations. In reality, “dialogic participation”
includes a relative role for transmission of information. As a result, the dialogue
process remains in tension with the transmission dimension of communicative
experience.
Watzlawick et al. (1967) have demonstrated the existence of a tension
between content or message and relationship in communication. Relationship is
the context of communication and functions as a metacommunication for the
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content. Bougnoux (1995) elaborates on Watzlawick’s tension between content
and relationship and calls the former information and the latter communication
(see also Pearce & Pearce, 2004). Carey’s (1989, 1992) articulation of this tension is
particularly interesting for this research project. Carey has illustrated in the
American context the fact that the basic orientation to communication remains
grounded in modernistic metaphors of effective transmission including
“imparting,” “sending,” “transmitting,” or “giving information to others” (15).
Resulting from the dominance of the transmission view of communication,
American culture and social thought are weak with regard to the ritual view of
communication. For the ritual view is the opposite of the transmission view and
understands the communicative experience with terms such as “sharing,”
“participation,” “association,” “fellowship,” and “the possession of a common
faith.” This definition exploits the ancient identity and common roots of the
terms “commonness,” “communion,” “community,” and “communication.” A
ritual view of communication is not directed toward the extension of messages in
space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting
information but the representation of shared beliefs.” (17) “Dialogic
participation” does not highlight the “maintenance of society in time” to the
detriment of social transformation. Likewise, it should not be reduced to its
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critique of the modernistic conception of communication exclusively centered on
effective transmission of information.
“Dialogic participation” envisions a participatory communication
grounded on a genuine and democratic mutuality of participants. Because of its
dialogic ground, this participatory communication becomes capable of
transmitting information without silencing and is sensitive to the “commonness”
of a community in a particular historical moment without stifling social
transformation. The conceptualization of “dialogic participation” allows this
research to sustain the communicative tension between sending, transmitting, or
giving information on the one hand and on the other hand participating, sharing
or communicating “shared beliefs.” Acknowledging the existence of these
different inflexions about the tension within communicative experience, this
research project adopts a dialogic framework because dialogue focuses directly
on the responsibility of the subjects in participation process.
The discussion of participatory communication in chapter one considers a
foreground issue for this entire research project: the communicative practice of
elitist democrats, communication professionals and public policy experts. The
articulation of the participatory communication suggests the distinction of two
metaphors, monologic participation and dialogic participation. The chapters
demonstrates that democracy serves as a pretext for elitist democrats, experts,
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intellectuals and to become monologic participants who may have brilliant
contributions but who, by successfully transmitting professionally packed
information, end up silencing the external world and the other. Their silencing
communicative practices compromise genuine dialogue, weaken democracy,
thwart sustainable development and hinder effective public policies. The
suggested metaphor of dialogic participation highlights the dialogic dimension
of participation in order to move participation practices beyond the liberal
democratic trap of privileging individual "rights" to the detriment of the
common good (Deetz, 1999). To elaborate further this dialogic dimension of
participation as requirement of “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984), chapter two
explores the background question of the whole interpretive endeavor: “What
holds us together?” The chapter claims that “public dialogue” holds together




“WHAT HOLDS US TOGETHER?”
Community is the overcoming of otherness in living unity.
 Martin Buber
About Easter of 1914 there met a group consisting of representatives of several European
nations for a three-day discussion that was intended to be preliminary to further talks.
We wanted to discuss together how the catastrophe, which we all believed was imminent,
could be avoided. Without our having agreed beforehand on any sort of modalities for our
talk, all the presuppositions of genuine dialogue were fulfilled. From the first hour
immediacy reigned between all of us, some of whom had just got to know one another;
everyone spoke with an unheard-of unreserved, and clearly not a single one of the
participants was in bondage to semblance.
In respect of its purpose the meeting must be described as a failure (though even now in
my heart it is still not a certainty that it had to be a failure); the irony of the situation
was that we arranged the final discussion for the middle of August, and in the course of
events the group was soon broken up. Nevertheless, in the time that followed, not one of
the participants doubted that he shared in a triumph of the interhuman.
Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, 86-87
Chapter two takes Martin Buber's view on dialogue to interpret public
dialogue. The interpretation develops the communicative dimension of "living
together" (Chalvidan, 1995) in democracy as the necessary background context
for a deeply dialogic understanding of participation and participatory
communication. As the chapter asks “what holds us together?” it problematizes
this “living together,” and the investigation of the question evolves around three
major metaphors: dialogue, public dialogue and participatory public dialogue. Out
of Buber’s philosophical anthropology of dialogue and Anderson, Cissna and
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others’ development of the concept of public dialogue (Anderson & Cissna, 1997;
Cissna & Anderson, 2002; Spano, 2001), chapter two follows up with the
argument of chapter one on participatory communication and frames the
metaphor of participatory public dialogue. Rather than presenting an exhaustive
description of public dialogue, the research employs this metaphor to focus  the
discussion on the issue of participation in public dialogue. Such interpretation of
participation in the framework of public dialogue highlights both the foreground
and the background of the communicative practices by which the intellectual
elite silence the illiterate and the poor in the particular case of Benin.  While
participatory communication is interested in social subjects, public dialogue is
particularly keen to consider what holds communities together in a democracy
(Anderson et al., 1996). Democracy and dialogic communities depend then on
individuals, citizens, and in the language of this research, dialogic participants
engaged in the public space of “living together.” The chapter has three sections
that organize the discussion around three major metaphors: dialogue, public
dialogue and participatory public dialogue. But before these three sections, a first
one articulates the significance of the question “What holds us together?”
I. What holds us together?
The chapter interprets public dialogue in order to gain some insight into
what holds democratic societies together. Before the connection between public
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dialogue and “what holds us together” becomes clearer, it is important to explore
the question itself. Asking “what holds a democratic society together?” identifies
the kind of democracies established in the last two centuries in the West and the
implication for the democratization efforts underway in “Third World” countries
like Benin. This first section of the chapter examines the connection of the
question to the theory of modern liberal democracy and the second section
argues that Buber’s understanding of dialogue has much to contribute to the
debate.
A. Liberal democracy and “what holds us together?”
What makes democracy properly “modern” is, according to Chantal
Mouffe (2000), the combination between democratic tradition and liberalism
theory. “The old democratic principle that ‘power should be exercised by the
people’ emerges again, but this time within a symbolic framework informed by
the liberal discourse, with its strong emphasis on the value of individual liberty
and on human rights. Those values are central to the liberal tradition and they
are constitutive of the modern view of the world” (2). Within modern liberal
democracy and other modern democratic conceptions such as representative
democracy, constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy, or pluralist
democracy exists a contradiction between the liberal tradition of individual
liberty and the democratic tradition of equality between governed and
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governing. In other words, there is a contradiction between the rights of the
individual and the power of the people. The current research confronts this
contradiction by asking: what holds democracy together? Is it the “universalistic
liberal logic” of rights? Is it the democratic conception of equality and the need to
constitute politically a ‘demos’? Or is it a combination of the two? If so, what
kind of combination?
The question is relevant for all democracies, not just young democracies.
As Pierre Henri Chalvidan (1995) puts it, “the first problem of our modern
democracies is to reinvent – not necessarily at the national level –a new space
from which freedom can spring, that is, a new space of “vouloir-vivre-ensemble”
[will of living together] supported by shared values.  Young democracies in
Africa must invent this space, while old democracies have to re-invent it”
(Chalvidan, 1995, 68). In February 1990, a glimpse of such space clearly opened
up powerfully enough to become the founding event that launched the impetus
of the democratization process in Benin. The event, a nationwide public dialogue
called the “National Conference” (Adamon, 1995), serves as the case study of this
research. That public space from whence freedom sprang and where “democratic
renewal” was sowed in Benin was and remains the near mythical scene of
intense dialogic engagement between institutional powers, civil society and
popular imaginary (Benegas, 2003, 153). The Conference constitutes what it
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means for a people to come together through public dialogue. The current
research builds on this event to point to what the democratic Benin, like every
democracy, still needs to learn existentially: What does it mean for a democratic
people to stay and grow together?
Numerous theories have attempted to answer this question. The chapter
now examines three of these theories discussed by Mouffe (2000). First of all, the
research disagrees with Carl Shmitt when he dismisses the possibility of liberal
democracy to hold a society together. He claims that such regime is non viable,
since liberalism negates democracy and democracy negates liberalism. That is, as
it stresses the right of the individual, liberalism fails to account for equality
between individuals and the participation of each in the constitution of the
demos. In the meanwhile, as democracy emphasizes the power of the people, it
tends to sacrifice the right of each individual. The second theory is Bill Clinton’s
version of “triangulation” and its European versions by Blair and Schröder. They
project to create a “consensus at the center” by pretending to move “beyond left
and right.” Mouffe (2000) charges that they leave unchallenged the neo-liberal
hegemony with its “dogmas about the inviolable rights of property [and] the all-
encompassing virtues of the market” (6). And as they abandon the traditional
fight of the left for equality and popular sovereignty, possibilities of power
transformation become virtually impossible in a one-dimensional world where
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right-wing popular parties can easily make significant inroads. The third theory,
‘deliberative democracy,’ seeks neither consensus nor mutual exclusion between
liberalism and democracy.  The two major advocates of this position, John Rawls
and Jürgen Habermas, “believe that through adequate deliberative procedures it
should be possible to overcome the conflict between individual rights and
liberties and the claims for equality and popular participation” (8). However,
each of them ends up privileging one tradition over the other: liberalism in the
case of Rawls and democracy in the case of Habermas.
These three theories belong to the rationalist dominant perspective of
modern democracy that has no other resources to resolve the liberty-equality
dilemma of liberal democracy except the logic of exclusion or inclusion, leading
to either/or resolution of the tension between equality and liberty. The research
follows Mouffe (2000) in her insightful analysis to the point where she offers to
go beyond the rationalist perspective in order to see the tension between
liberalism and democracy not as a contradiction to be resolved but as paradox to
live with productively.
The tension should be envisaged instead as creating a relation not of negotiation
but of contamination, in the sense that once the articulation of the two principles
has been effectuated – even if in a precarious way – each of them changes the
identity of the other. The regimes of collective identities resulting from this
process of articulation are ensembles whose configurations are always something
more than the addition of their internal elements. As always in social life, there is
a ‘gestaltic’ dimension which is decisive in understanding the perception and
behaviour of collective subjects. 10
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Instead of seeking to resolve the contradiction between equality and liberty the
acknowledgement of the democratic paradox realizes that pluralist democratic
politics consists in pragmatic, precarious and necessarily unstable forms of
negotiating its constitutive paradox (11). The challenge for contemporaneous
democracies then amounts to upholding the equality of all as well as the rights of
each citizen and collective ensemble. At this point, the research part ways with
the political theory of Mouffe to look for another theoretical framework to
accounts for what holds a democratic community together in the paradoxical
unity of individual right, group interest and common good.
B. Buber and ”what holds us together”
The research adopts Martin Buber’s anthropological philosophy of
dialogue because of its poetic depth in interpreting the democratic paradox, the
‘gestaltic’ dimension in the perception and behavior of collective subjects, and
the limits of modern rationalist perspective. Better yet, Buber’s dialogue offers a
combination of the descriptive and prescriptive perspectives which provides the
interpretative inquiry with theoretical insights as well as practical “concreteness”
in tending to abstract categories, but ever returning to the living I, the Thou and
the happening of dialogue in a particular historical moment. The research adopts
Buber’s philosophical anthropology of dialogue because of its capacity to
combine in the unity of contrary “breath and intensity into an integral unity of
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life and thought” without sacrificing the “concrete complexity and paradoxicality
of existence” (Friedman, 1960, 5). This inquiry brings to the fore the potential of
Buber’s dialogue to interpret communicatively what holds together a democratic
society. Although squarely communicative, the dialogic approach claims nothing
short of a “way of life” and a “way of thought.” As Maurice Friedman puts it:
I should venture to say that the vital need of our age is to find a way of life
and a way of thought which will preserve the truth of human existence in
all its concrete complexity and which will recognize that this truth is
neither 'subjective' nor 'objective' –neither reducible to individual
temperament on the one hand, nor to any type of objective absolute or
objective cultural relativism on the other hand. Friedman, 1960, 4-5.
Instead of a modern rationality of either/or and an illusionary ‘happy middle,’
Buber’s ‘narrow ridge’ accounts for the paradox and even the “suffering”
included in a democratic “living together.”
Among the communicative considerations of what hold communities
together, some dialogue scholars have articulated the preeminence of dialogue
over debate, argumentation or news media. Contrasting public dialogue with
debate, deliberation, metanarratives, Plato’s a priori ideals and privatized
therapeutic discourse, Arnett (2001) underscores the capacity of the integrative
idea of public dialogue to hold in the unity of contraries both differences and
points of commonality within the public domain and to keep the conversation
going in the historical moment. Cissna and Anderson (2004) believe as well that
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“modern media enable us to transmit messages more efficiently, but
communication itself, as we are only too painfully aware, does not automatically
improve” (202).
In The Conversation of Journalism: Communication, Community and News,
Anderson, Dardenne and Killenberg (1996) argue that “in envisioning news-
based democracy, Americans conceived the first version of what we have come
to call an information society – a social order organized around the marketing of
industrially manufactured cultural commodities.” They claim that although in
the eighteenth century American newspapers and the postal system were
instrumental in bringing together a continental democracy and in doing so
attempted to prove wrong Montesquieu who had long assumed that a
republican state must remain small, a social order imagined in the terms of
“manufactured cultural commodities” and “manufacturing of consent” (Herman
& Chomsky, 1988) can never be genuinely democratic.
The evidence gathered here up to now leads to the conclusion that the
fascination of young democracies with political deliberation and the press is not
sufficient to bring together a society. Democratic societies still need a deeper
understanding of the significance of dialogue and public dialogue. Cissna and
Anderson (2004) argue with reason that dialogue is about to become one of the
central questions for 21st century communication studies. And a growing number
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of dialogic project illustrate their claim: the Public Conversation Project (Chasin
et al., 1996), the National Issues Forum (Mathews, 1994), Study Circle (2002) and
Public Dialogue Consortium (Spano, 2001) provide examples from the United
States. The current research does not aim to follow these examples in developing
a practical project of public dialogue in Benin. It focuses rather on a theoretical
and background interpretation of a Buber-inspired dialogue for the public sphere
of the democratization in Benin that may provide resources for a future project of
this sort.
To understand the theoretical and background significance of public
dialogue in holding a democratic society together and facilitating broader
participation, it helps to recall a number of similar theoretical intuitions. The
descriptive relevance and prescriptive power of Buber’s dialogue extended into
the public arena is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s intuition that language
anticipates a community of language users, Chomsky’s (1959) communal
assumption of grammar and Habermas’ ideal speech situation. It is reminiscent
of Gadamer’s ontology of understanding in which the hermeneutic situation
points to the fact that the social character of the formation of experience precedes
each and every expression. The point common to these different communication
views is that members of communication communities “present an acceptance of
the ideal [communication] as a background for each communicative act
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performed. Even the most strategic act of self-interested expression takes place in
a language community where presumptions of reciprocity and symmetry exist”
(Deetz, 1999, 148). The project a Buber-inspired articulation of public dialogue is
not a technique of debate, deliberation or journalism but a communicative
background of lived mutuality between I’s saying Thou’s to each other and
saying We together out of a common “betweeness” traversed by relation and
distance. Though in everyday practice, a technical and monologic I-It dialogue
happens more often than this genuine I-Thou interpersonal and public dialogue
(Deetz, 1999), the later dialogue is the ideal communication of reciprocity and
symmetry whose anticipation and presumption make any human
communication possible and which carries within it the potential to hold
democratic societies together. The chapter turns now to this task of articulating
Buber’s public dialogue.
II. Dialogue
This section on dialogue acknowledges first the existence of multiple
dialogic voices and then interprets the interpersonal framework of Buber’s
dialogue and finally shows that his philosophy extends beyond the interpersonal
framework to offer insights into the public domain (Arnett, 2001).
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A. Dialogic voices
Around the works of dialogic primary thinkers such as Buber, Freire,
Bakhtin and Gadamer, dialogue has attracted so much interest in the last part of
the 20th century that there are almost as many usages and approaches as there are
scholars (Stewart & Zediker, 2000; Cissna & Anderson, 1998b). Some scholars
organize these various perspectives on dialogue into two groups: prescriptive
theories and descriptive theories (Stewart & Zediker, 2000).  The descriptive
perspective understands that human existence is inherently dialogic with social,
relational or interactional features. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1986) understands
dialogue in this sense and so do social constructionists such as Gergen (1994) and
Shotter (1993a and 2000). Martin Buber (1923) and the scientist David Bohm ( ??)
have a prescriptive approach that accounts for “dialogue as an ideal to be striven
toward or a goal to be achieved as an outcome of considered and ethically-
freighted choices (Stewart & Zediker, 2000, 227). Although later Stewart, Zediker
and Black (2004) introduced some nuances in the distinction between
prescriptive and descriptive accounts, the distinction proves helpful in the
context of this research because it shows the particularity of Buber’s dialogic
voice among the others and its significance for this research.
This research adopts Buber’s philosophy of dialogue for the main reason
that, more than the other primary dialogic thinkers, Buber combines prescription
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and description in a "unity of contraries" (Friedman, 1960). In the terms of
Stewart & Zediker (2000) and Stewart, Zediker & Black (2004), Buber bases his
prescriptions on descriptive accounts, that is, the prescription of how things
ought to be and the description of the way things are. This research relies on
Buber’s emphasis on the “concrete,” the “existential situation,” the “historical
moment” as well as the ethical and the ideal.  This interpretive endeavor follows
the paradoxical impulses of description and prescription of Buber’s
anthropological philosophy that points to the twofold orientation of human
beings. In the first orientation, humans experience “encountering” in
“instrumental, objectifying, monologic or I-It ways” (227). In the second
orientation, humans experience “encountering” in immediate, mutual, dialogic,
or I-Thou ways. Although the two orientations exist in Buber’s historical
moment, the I-It is dominant and he spent his life calling for the I-Thou relation.
Considering “the way things are” in Benin in this historical moment dominated
by “monologic participation” and a “culture of silence,” the research frames a
call for an I-Thou relation, a call particularly addressed to the intellectuals called
Akowé. For the research to situate Buber’s dialogue in the community life of
Benin, the following discussion comments on the interpersonal framework of
Buber’s philosophy and then the discussion brings to bear the ideas in this
philosophy that leads Buber’s dialogue beyond the interpersonal framework.
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B. Buber and interpersonal dialogue
As indicated earlier, typical work addressing of Buber's dialogic theory
addresses his phenomenological description of man's twofold orientation
articulated in his 1923 seminal work I-Thou: the orientation of I- It and the
orientation of I-Thou. The I-It orientation is a subject-object relation in which the I
objectifies another person or other beings by knowing and using them. The I-
Thou orientation is a dialogic meeting whose meaning is found in neither one nor
the other of the partners, nor in both added together, but in the interchange. This
twofold attitude is based on the ontology of the 'between' because "all real living
is meeting." In the first essay that begins the collection entitled Knowledge of Man,
Buber adds two important principles to his anthropology: distance and relation.
In dialogic life, the distance allows dialogic partners to be confirmed as
independent individuals and the "entering into relation" is mutual confirmation,
co-operation and genuine dialogue between an individual self and others as
independent as him. The goal of dialogue is then "completing distance by
relation" (Friedman, Knowledge of Man, 21).
 These interpersonal expressions of I-It, I-Thou, between, distance and
relation point poetically to a life, as Maurice Friedman puts it, “a life of dialogue.”
The research follows Buber to understand dialogue as a “life of dialogue,” as
opposed to a set of techniques. For Buber, "genuine dialogue" can be either
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spoken or silent. Its essence lies in the fact that "each of the participants really has
in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to
them with the intention of establishing living mutual relation between himself
and them" (Friedman, 1960, 87). Dialogue is a life of living mutual relation and
the effort to gain insight into this life requires not only a theoretic effort, but also
an existential engagement, a courageous walk on a narrow rocky ridge. "I have
occasionally described,” explains Buber, “my standpoint to my friends as the
'narrow ridge.' I wanted by this to express that I did not rest on the broad upland
of a system that includes a series of sure statements about the absolute, but on a
narrow rocky ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible
knowledge but the certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed" (Between
Man and Man, 1947). This research acknowledges this narrow rocky ridge and
hopes to engage the intellectual elite in Benin with it because it is faithful to the
concrete complexity of life particularly in the public domain where the following
section places Buber’s philosophy of dialogue.
C. Buber beyond interpersonal dialogue
Although no documentation shows Buber using the term "public
dialogue," he has developed his philosophical anthropology beyond an
exclusively interpersonal framework. His essays "What is Man" and "What is
Common to All" demonstrate his conviction that "only men who are capable of
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truly saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one another". The
Essential We is equally as important as the Thou because "Man has always had his
experiences as I, his experiences with others, his experiences with himself; but it
is as We, ever again as We that he has constructed and developed a world out of
his experiences." It is as a We that men has built "a common world of speech and
a common order of beings." The relation between the Thou and the We testifies to
the fact that Buber’s dialogic philosophy realizes such an insightful connection
between interpersonal relation and community relation. The focus of this
research on community dialogue or public dialogue does not lose sight of the
significance of interpersonal dialogue. Works like Arnett and Arneson’s Dialogic
Civility in a Cynical Age: Community Hope and Interpersonal Relationships (1999)
have contributed to demonstrate the necessary connection between interpersonal
and community dialogue. In the same sense, this research combines the two
literatures of participatory communication and public dialogue in an attempt to
show, as Buber says, that only men and women who are capable of truly saying
Thou to one another can truly say We with one another. At this point it is
sufficient to show that while being ceaselessly interpersonal, Buber’s dialogue




This third section of the chapter discusses first the ongoing elaboration of
Buberian understanding of public dialogue by contemporary dialogue scholars.
The second point of the section goes back to Buber’s concept of the between to
offer the contribution of this research to a Buber-inspired understanding of
public dialogue. The third point brings to the fore the implications for the
democratic society of a Buber-inspired conception of public dialogue. The fourth
and last point signals that the challenge is still ahead for a fuller development of
a theory of public dialogue from Buber’s philosophy.
A. Definition of Public Dialogue
Scholars such as Anderson and Cissna (1997), Cissna and Anderson
(2002), Arnett and Arneson (1999), and Arnett (2001) and Spano (2001) have
developed for public contexts Buber’s theory of dialogue. Kenneth N. Cissna and
Rob Anderson (2002, 11) situate their understanding of public dialogue against
the backdrop of ongoing intellectual conversations when they claim:
Our position rejects Buber’s early belief that media and publicity intimidate
dialogue, but affirms the position he took later, after his illuminating public
dialogue with Rogers. Our position rejects the one sketched by Lippman’s efficient
bureaucracy of planners in favor of the messier process by which Dewey trusted
communities to talk a future into existence by fits and starts. When a space
somehow is cleared for dialogue and when sincere communicators expect and
invite it, we glimpse futures that could not have been available or even imagined
beforehand. Sometimes that space will be relatively private and interpersonal,
such as family dispute or a therapeutic relationships, sometimes quasi-public,
such as classroom interaction, a church committee, or a corporate training
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session, and sometimes as fully publicized as a school board meeting or a
legislative hearing covered by local or national journalists.
In spite of Buber’s justified fear that publicity can compromise the genuineness
of dialogue and against the hegemony of a Lippman-like enclave of professional
elites technologizing public opinion (Hauser, 1999), public dialogue unfolds as a
messy activity that trusts the ability of “communities to talk a future into
existence by fits and starts.” In this definition, the possibility of public dialogue
is, as it must be, a matter of trust informed by realism and hope (Cissna &
Anderson (2002). The ways “communities talk a future into existence” is not
limited to speech. Cissna & Anderson (2004, 196) add that public dialogue
“identifies the attitudes with which participants approach each other, the ways
they talk and act, the consequences of their meeting, and the context within
which they meet.” As a basic form of democratic conversation, public dialogue
enables the participative inclusion of the complex array of communication
patterns, cultural frameworks and moral orders that exist within a pluralistic
community at any given time (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997; Strike, 1994).  In public
dialogue, participation calls each member and diverse communicative patterns
and moral orders “to be a part, take a part, and have a part" (Bordenave, 1994,
37) of a “conversational society” (Anderson & al., 1996). The concept of public
dialogue points to a quality of attitude, talk, and participation indispensable to
make, for instance, the act of voting meaningful, to invigorate the public sphere
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and to give democracy its very existence (Matthews, 1994 quoted by Spano,
2001).  To the freedom to speak, public dialogue joins “the responsibility to listen
and the right to be heard” (Spano, 2001).
In sum, public dialogue is the communicative “living together” of a
pluralistic community that faces its differences and disagreements (Arnett, 2001)
and still secures broadly the freedom to speak as well as the responsibility to
listen and the right to be heard. “Public dialogue” is the seedbed of a new
democracy and the lifeblood of a strong one, and it appears to become
particularly significant for democratic communication in the 21st century. This
research believes that this theoretical insight is timely relevant for the Beninese
democracy born in the public dialogue of the National Conference. The
ontological reality of the between in public dialogue has potential to become a key
interpretive concept in understanding public dialogue in Benin.
C. The Between of Public Dialogue
The Between is the ontological site where the "mutual confirmation” of
human beings. This mutual confirmation in the between is better understood in
the event that Buber calls "making present." In Martin Buber and the Eternal,
Friedman explains that making the other present "means to imagine, quite
concretely, what another man is wishing, feeling, perceiving, and thinking. It is
through this making present that we grasp another as self, that is, as a being
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whose distance from me cannot be separated from my distance from him and
whose particular experience I can make present" (Friedman, 1986, 55). That is, as
an ontological site, the between is also a distance – the distance of the other from
me and my distance from the “other.” Because my distance and the other’s are
not separate, they constitute the between, which for this reason is also called the
“interhuman.” In this ontological between and interhuman of distance, relation
and concrete presence through mutual confirmation, the following realities find
their meaning: subjectivity, human sciences, subject-object relation, language and
even society and state.
For Buber, subjectivity does not emerge from "man's relation to himself,"
which is a psychological development evolving within the soul of the individual.
Subjectivity is the "Self-becoming" of each individual and happens as Buber says
"in the making present of another self and in the knowledge that one is made
present in his own self by the other" (Friedman, 1986, 55). The dialogic
understanding of subjectivity is crucial in Buber’s entire anthropological
philosophy and it is similarly central to public dialogue.  "The fundamental fact
of human existence, according to Buber's anthropology, is man with man. When
two individuals 'happen' to each other, then there is an essential remainder
which is common to them but which reaches out beyond the special sphere of
each. That remainder is the basic reality, the sphere of ’the between,’ of ’the
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interhuman’” (55-56). Without denying the subjectivity the possibility of a
difference  secured by the movement of distancing, the between is the space
beyond the dialogic subjectivity. Yet in this space of “man with man,” the
dialogic subjectivity finds the ground of dialogic development and the protection
against the narcissism of “man’s relation to himself.” The connection between the
dialogic subjectivity, the between and public dialogue becomes apparent when
Buber says: "only men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one another can
truly say We with one another." For Buber, public dialogue “happens” when by
virtue of the between holding them together, in distance and in relation, dialogic
subjectivities say the “essential We” with one another.
 The significance of the between and dialogic subjectivities for public
dialogue requires  an awareness of the central role of anthropological philosophy
to a Buberian understanding of public dialogue. Buber is critical of human
sciences in so far as they each treat one aspect of the human –the sociological, the
economic, the political, the historical, or the psychological. According to him, “if
they are to be understood as human sciences, they must recover their grounding
in that human wholeness and uniqueness which is found in the recognition of
the varieties of peoples, the types, and characters of the human soul, and the
stages of human life” (Friedman, 1996, 15). For instance, this human wholeness
and uniqueness is lacking when the idea of public dialogue is reduced to “public
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opinion” by political philosophers and to public debate or argumentation by
speech act professors. By contrast, Buber’s anthropological philosophy guides
the focus of this communication research to tend to the people and communities
of Benin in their communicative concreteness. This holistic capacity of dialogue
makes it a viable alternative to modern rationalism as it refrains from imposing
an either/or logic on life and embraces the concrete complexity not through facile
inclusion or the “happy middle,” but with the courage of the narrow rocky ridge.
As such, the research is a philosophical anthropology of the dialogic man, a
philosophy of “man with man” (Buber), a “philosophy of the interhuman”
(Friedman, 1996, 16) in Benin. The significance of the between in anthropological
philosophy does not stop with its consideration of the wholeness and uniqueness
of “man with man” in Benin. The between also calls for this study of public
dialogue and the subject conducting this research to be dialogic.
Buber believed “that science itself was based upon Thou – actual
intuitions of Thou, but the elaboration had to do with the It” (Friedman, 1996, 5).
In this sense, this current anthropological endeavor does not find satisfaction in
the unavoidable I-It relation that any intellectual enterprise induces. It searches
for an existential orientation toward the Thou, the Thou of silenced communities
with whom the research calls the intellectual elite to do research as a way of
humbly accepting to be in respectful dialogue. The validity of such a research lies
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in the “making present,” in the “happening,” the “unfolding,” the “rising” of the
I-Thou relation. As Friedman (1996) puts it, this existential orientation begins
with the philosophical anthropologist: “only if as philosophical anthropologist
one is a problem to oneself can one understand the human as a problem to itself”
(16). The researcher conducting this interpretive research is a problem to himself
and auto-addresses himself critically when the research calls for the
communicative silencer or the monologic participant to become responsive listener of
the silenced participants in participatory public dialogue.
In the light of the centrality of between in understanding dialogic
subjectivities, anthropological philosophy and the philosophical anthropologist,
the current research takes on the challenge to point to a public communication
that does not polarize, politicize or instrumentalize the process of dialogue. The
significance of between in a Buberian understanding of public dialogue helps
describe and call for the happening, the unfolding, the rising of a public dialogue
able to account for a strong democracy where the confirmation of the individual
and the “elemental togetherness” of the dialogic community are not a
contradiction but a productive paradox:
Where the dialogue is fulfilled in its being, between partners who have
turned to one another in truth, who express themselves without reserve
and are free of the desire for semblance, there is brought into being a
memorable common fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else. At
such times, at each such time, the word arises in a substantial way
between men who have been seized in their depths and opened out by the
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dynamic of an elemental togetherness. The interhuman opens out what
otherwise remains unopened.
If one were to counts the ways this “interhuman opens out what otherwise
remains unopened,” one cannot stop at the dialogic subjectivities “seized in their
depths” or the dialogic communication in which the “word arises in a substantial
way between” these dialogic subjectivities. Buber-inspired public dialogue
reconfigures the current conceptions of society.
D. From ‘egocentric model of society’ to ‘dialogic society’
To flesh out more clearly the happening of public dialogue, the
interpretation now moves to the large scale of society. Buber acknowledges that
“this phenomenon is indeed well known in dialogue between two persons; but I
have also sometimes experienced it in a dialogue in which several have taken
part.” He narrates the example quoted in length at the beginning of the chapter.
In his essay “What is Common to All,” he also explores the importance of the
interhuman in the Western civilization and in ancient Eastern civilizations as
well.
Buber’s entire life of dialogue, captured in the paradox between the I-It
and the I-Thou relation, signals that his conception of dialogue is up against a
totalizing modern world view. Modernity has created a “world of I-IT” whose
societal version has been called “the technological society” (Jacques Ellul, 1964)
or the “egocentric model of society” (Levinas). Interpreting Levinas, Burgraeve
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(2002) explains that the Western philosophy has founded an ontological nature of
the ego understood as the “effort to be.” This ego struggles for autonomy and
free self-development and when it meets the world and other egos, it needs to
“comprehend” them by aggressively totalizing them. The ego draws the others
into the project of its own existence, which is aimed first and always at freedom
and liberation for itself. This leads to a self-interested, or egocentric model of
society, grounded in the "economic, totalizing will to freedom, of the
autonomous ego" (Burgraeve, 2002, 57). The “egocentric model of society” can
only see a contradiction between the freedom and equality as evidence by liberal
democracy. This modern conception of society explains as well what has been
called the “black man’s burden” (Davidson, 1992).
Not only are the African societies and nation-states emerging from the
colonization rooted in the authoritarian tradition but more important, they are
rooted in the “acceptance of the legacy of colonial partitions, and of the moral
and political practices of colonial rule in its institutions” (162). The burden of
Africans is the incapacity to move away from this localized “egocentric model of
society” that continues in a global world, to make them victims of a “new period
of indirect subjection to the history of Europe” (10). Bratton and van de Walle
(1994) give the following accurate picture of the situation. In most African
societies, certainly in Benin,
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the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than
through ideology or law… relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a
formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices
less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The
distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred… personal
relationships… constitutes the foundation and superstructure of political
institutions. The interaction between the ‘big man’ and his extended retinue
defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the
humblest village assembly. (Quoted by Paul Ahluwalia, 2001)
The situation of the African version of an “egocentric model of society” has led to
the crisis of the ‘nation-state’ of the descriptions of “criminalization of the state”
(Jean-Francois Bayart & al., 1999). On a similar note, Patrick Chabal and Jean-
Pascal Daloz (1999), who defend the thesis of “disorder as political instrument”
used by leaders, believe that the root of the African crisis is a crisis of modernity
and “this crisis of modernity is rooted in the deep history of the societies in
which it is taking place” (xviii). The point of the current research is to frame at
least for the Akowe (intellectuals) who belong to this group of “big men,” the
theoretical background conditions for a communicative call of “corrective
conversation” (Arnett, 2004, 81) with the Western modernity and its “egocentric
model of society.”
The discussion of Buber-inspired public dialogue offers this theoretical
background condition. Some current intellectual transformations favored the
move from an “egocentric model of society” toward “dialogic societies,” because
“dialogue is penetrating social relations from international politics to coexistence
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within homes" (Flecha & al., 2003, 128). “Dialogic societies” are not dialogic
because they reached the perfection of public dialogue, if such thing exists. They
are dialogic because they are penetrated by “dialogic transformations,” which
constitutes an emerging change of orientation from the modernization
framework of “destructive imposition” on the other – the other person, culture or
people. Contrary to the “cultural or personal imposition” of modernization,
dialogue “enables the equality of difference to come to fruition, allowing
different people to live together in the same territory enjoying equal rights that
will reinforce rather than weaken their respective identities” (131). “Dialogic
societies” are partially historic transformation and partially theoretic
propositions.  By framing “dialogic societies,” dialogic scholars recognize that
“what we have achieved so far is far from what we still aim to achieve. But it is
precisely this tension that makes dialogue more forward. When we reach what
we are proposing today, this distance will remain, because by then we will be
proposing even more egalitarian and democratic goals” (131).
D. Dialogue: the challenge ahead
Commonly, many people use the term dialogue with banality and access
to dialogue in public is still rare and represents “a significant challenge to our
culture[s]” Cissna and Anderson (2004, 202). The challenge is due to the fact that
“contemporary life in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is often characterized
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either by a cynicism that says that dialogue is, in fact, impossible and ephemeral,
or by sunny optimism that presumes that dialogue is little more than warm and
friendly with each other…” (202). Notwithstanding these difficulties in seeing
the significance of dialogue, scholars believe that dialogue has a role to play in
“an increasingly and necessarily pluralized society and in an era of persistent
conflicts and disagreements across ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual
preferences, as well as ideological, economic, power, and status distinctions.”
This reality of social fragmentation mandates that in interpersonal relationships,
in families, in groups and organizations, in neighborhoods and communities,
within whole societies and between peoples and nations, we learn the potentials
of dialogue “to facilitate public talking and listening, even when participants do
not initially identify with, or even like or respect, the particular persons or
positions they confront” (202). In sum, the current research share the conviction
that John J. Pauly describes saying: “I think of dialogue as a fine word for
humans’ deep, persistent, and self-reflexive attempts to come to terms with the
world and one another” (2004, 246).
 IV. Participatory Public Dialogue
The three first sections of the chapter have laid a sufficient background to
allow this last section to bring together the insights gleaned from the double
literature of participatory communication and public dialogue by suggesting the
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concept of “participatory public dialogue” as one capital guiding metaphor for this
research project.
This research strengthens its theoretical base by situating itself in both the
literature of participation and of public dialogue. The discussion of the meaning
of participation in public dialogue marks the scope and the background context
of this research project. While there are good reasons for studying, for example,
the participants who in Benin benefit from media access, vote competence,
education and health care assistance, the present exploration focuses on the
participatory communication of the citizens who keep the conversation going in
the public arena.
Freire’s participation of historical subjects living on organic soil and
exercising their right to intervene on their social world is consonant with a
number of scholarly developments covering multiple of dimensions of
participation. In terms of scholarship, the broader context of this research project
includes the literature of “participatory communication” (Jacobson & Servaes,
1999), “participatory democracy” (Baber, 1984; Bordenave, 1994; Spano, 2001)
and “democratization of communication” (White, 1999). The specific scope of the
research restraints itself to participatory communication in public dialogue in the
context of Benin. The theoretical and practical center of these diverse scholarly
projects rests in the conviction that with participation “citizens should govern
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themselves at least in some public matters at least some of the time” (Spano,
2001, 26). Echoing Freire’s disagreement with liberal democracy and
modernization, these works constitute a constructive alternative to “thin
democratic” systems (Barber, 1984) in which public political participation is
limited to going to the polls to vote and answering opinion surveys. In “thin
democracies,” the responsibility of advancing public goods rests in the hands of
elected representatives, technical experts and news media (Spano, 2001). In
contrast with “thin democracy,” participation calls for a dynamic society, a
communal society “permanently built by all therefore belonging to all”
(Bordenave, 1994, 37).  In this literature, community participation is “a valuable
end in itself as well as a means to better life” (Figueroa & al. 2002, see also
Sevaes, 1996 and Deetz, 1999). However, the literature is not a unified body of
theory that specifies a precise determination of these ends and means, because of
the diverse contexts or local soils (White, 1994; Gumucio, 2001). Yet, researchers
tend to posit participation as a communicative orientation (Carey, 1992), a
“shared ideal” (Deetz, 1999) moving beyond the colonial, patronizing or
authoritarian “idea of some leading the struggles for others” (Servaes & Arnst,
1999, p. 109). Within this diverse literature of “participatory communication”
(Jacobson & Servaes, 1999), and “participatory democracy” (Spano, 2001) this
research project adopts precisely the framework of public dialogue (Spano, 2001;
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Cissna & Anderson, 2002, 2004). The next definitional discussion of participation
attempts to offer an additional focus to the concept within a dialogic framework.
While the literature has articulated participation in the contexts of
democracy, development and decision-making, the current research sets out to
interpret the participation of social subjects in the communicative context of
Benin interpreted with a Buber-inspired conception of public dialogue. This
research is then an interpretation in participatory communication, but its
particular angle of contribution consists of bringing forth the dialogic impulse in
both participation and communication. Efforts of participation are self-
contradictory when “monologue participants,” that is, elitist democrats, 2003),
clientelistic representatives, hegemonic experts and Akowé (intellectual elite) turn
participation into disguised tyranny and masked monologue resulting in a
“culture of silence,” a “world of silence” and a “silenced community.” To the
contrary, genuine participation requires “dialogic participants” who belong to a
personal world of encounter where the I and the Thou (Buber, 1970) are self-
actuated and self-determining historical subjects who work dialogically for
community development (Freire, 2002) through a continual social formation of
experience in an interaction that reaches beyond the intentions and opinions of
each participant (Gadamer, 1975). This dialogic impulse of participation already
available in the literature calls for a deeply dialogic understanding of
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communicative experience; such are the scholarship and initiatives of “public
dialogue.”
For the 21st century, the renewed interest in “public dialogue” and
particularly the Buberian approach advocated here appear as a communicative
background alternative to monologic dominance of technical communication,
informational society and news-based liberal democracy, which only offer thin
accounts of what hold society together. “Public dialogue” is the communicative
“living together” of a pluralistic community that faces its differences and
disagreements and still secures broadly the freedom to speak as well as the
responsibility to listen and the right to be heard.
“Participatory public dialogue” highlights the dialogic nature of
participatory communication with the distinction of “monologic participation”
from “dialogic participation.” Additionally, “participatory public dialogue” adds
to public dialogue the qualifier of “participatory” to draw attention to the issue
of participation in public dialogue. The particular interest of this research project
in public dialogue underscores how the quality of public dialogue depends on a
genuine and democratic participation by the members of the dialogic
community. Likewise, in “participatory public dialogue,” participation is not
limited to the defense of the right of the individual to the detriment of “living
together,” as it is the case in neo-liberalism and “egocentric model of society.” To
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the contrary, participation relies on the communicative background of “public
dialogue.”
Additionally, the metaphor of “participatory public dialogue” enables
chapter one and chapter two to frame the central question of the entire
dissertation. What is an alternative to unreflective practices of “systematically
distorted communication” (Deetz, 1992, 1999, 2004) and “culture of silence”
(Freire, 2002) unintentionally cultivated by professionals, experts and
intellectuals in democratic communities in search of “participatory public
dialogue”? In other words, given the indication that Akowé (intellectual) elite
inadvertently preclude the “silenced communities” from democratic
participation into public dialogue, what communicative solutions are
conceivable? The following chapters conceive of a communicative solution that
frames the monologic participant as communicative silencer to whom is addressed
the call to become a “Responsive I” and a communicative listener.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE: A PUBLIC DIALOGUE IN BENIN
We now need to be faithful to Him [God] by working hard in a spirit of sacrifice and the
love of neighbor. These are pillar-virtues indispensable to build a strong and
beautiful nation. I testify that these virtues inspired at various degrees the representatives
of the people during the National Conference. For now on, may they inspire at the highest
degree the people of Benin for the edification of a solid and beautiful Beninese nation.
Archbishop Isidore de Souza, Chairman of the National Conference
Chapters one and two interpret the scholarships of participatory
communication and public dialogue in order to prepare this research to
theoretically investigate two major questions: “what communicative praxis by
intellectuals?” and, considering the background of this communicative praxis,
“what holds us together?” As the metaphor of participatory public dialogue
attempts to capture the complementary dimension of the two foreground and
background questions the focus of this dissertation reads as follows: “In what
holds us together, what communicative praxis counts and what communicative
praxis is silenced?” With the clarity of focus offered by the metaphor of
participatory public dialogue, chapter three limits the scope of the investigation to a
case study, the historic public dialogue called “National Conference” (Les Actes,
1994 and Adamon, 1995). This chapter asks thus, “Considering the lived
experience of the National Conference interpreted as a public dialogue with
dialogic participation, what communicative praxis counts in Benin?”
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Through the exploration of the question, the chapter claims that the
political invention of the National Conference constitutes a locus of historicity to
investigate participation and dialogue in Benin. The chapter organizes the
discussions into four points: first the definition of National Conference; second,
the significance of historicity for the Conference; third, the discussion of the
growing scholarship on the Conference; and fourth, contribution of this research
as a dialogic interpretation of the National Conference.
I. Definition of National Conference
The following material defines the historic event called National
Conference in Benin. It belongs to the three subsequent sections to tease out this
definition from different angles as they interpret the historic event as a case
study for this research on participatory public dialogue.
The National Conference officially called “La Conférence des Forces Vives de
la Nation,” [the Conference of the Living Forces of the Nation) is an exceptional
public dialogue that took place on February, 19-28, 1990 in Cotonou, Benin
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994; Adamon, 1995; Banégas, 2003) to instill a
sense of hope to a nation engulfed into the darkest abyss of despair and poverty
by 17 years of General Matthieu Kérékou’s oppressive Marxist dictatorship. The
Conference “was a historic moment in the life of a small Third World country
which, as ‘things were falling apart,’ allowed reason and intelligence of heart to
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win over selfish interests and instincts in order to save everything anew” (de
Souza, 1994). “We won over fatality!” declared Albert Tévoédjrè during his
closing speech to the Conference (Les Actes, 1990). Such exclamation has entered
the popular consciousness as a common acknowledgement of the Conference’s
significance (Banégas, 2000). A truly defining moment it was. A defining moment
it remains. In the public’s conscience, the Conference stays an emblem of national
pride in near mythical proportion. Nearly fifteen years after it took place, the
National Conference kept a mythical significance in the popular conscience.
Richard Banégas (2003) noticed as did this researcher that people frequently refer
to it as the origin of “Democratic Renewal” in Benin.
One of the participants, Paulin Hountondji (1993) captures perceptively
the principle of the Conference in the following a posteriori definition:
National Conference is “a grand public debate, which allows every segment of the
population, social actors, decision makers and organized groups -political,
economic, or religious- the opportunity to evaluate together in contradictory
fashion, the performance of the regime while the whole nation witnesses through
live radio diffusion and television broadcasting. On the premise that each social
partner accepts the principle, this public debate becomes an alternative to violence
and physical confrontation as it turns into verbal expression the anger
accumulated in people’s heart.”
The National Conference effectively gathered 493 representatives of political
formations, religious communities, trade unions, professional associations,
regional organizations, farmers, artisans and Beninese abroad (Adamon, 1995).
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Through the live broadcasting on the state-run radio and television of the
proceedings, the entire population of 6 million (in 1990) experienced collectively
a verbal expression of their desire of revenge and anger, accusation and fear,
confession and reconciliation. The broadcasts transfixed populations in
surrounding Francophone countries, most of which will organize their own
National Conference following the Beninese model with different degrees of
success. The transition to multiparty democracy set in motion by the National
Conference was arguably one of contemporary Africa’s most successful
(Campbell, 1999).
In coherence with this definitional discussion, this research concentrates
on the National Conference and interprets the historic public dialogue according
to Buber-inspired conception of public dialogue. The interpretation affords the
claim that the Conference is the most significant experience of public dialogue in
the history of the nation, which holds some interpretive keys to understanding
the nation’s communicative praxis. The following section describes the nation
that invented the National Conference.
II. Benin and its National Conference
The National Conference affords the research a case study of nine days in
the life of the nation. This limited span of time, is embedded in the context of a
nation with a “longue durée” (Mbembe, 2000, 16), a long history, of which the
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nine days of National Conference constitute a representative echo. This section
presents selected elements of the history of Benin to help make the case that the
nature and outcomes of the National Conference were shaped by its
embeddedness in the particular history of the nation.
The immediate impetus leading to the Conference was the dying
dictatorship of Matthieu Kérékou. By force, he seized  power in October 1972 and
halted the endless cycle of coups d’état and political instability that have always
characterized the first years of existence of the country first known as Dahomey,
which became independent from France in August 1, 1960. Over the years, the
people grew restless under the General’s socialist dictatorship. At the end of the
1980’s national and international pressure was mounting and the regime was
inexorably eroding: bankruptcy, dissidence within the military, students’
insurrection, demonstrations by unpaid government employees, popular
disenchantment, hardened relations with France. This internal crisis erupted
against the backdrop of an international context traveled by geo-political
transformations evidenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Campbell, 1999,
Houngnikpo, 2001).
With their exogenous and endogenous dimensions, the causes of the 1989
crisis in Benin reach far back beyond Kérékou’s coup d’état in October 1972. The
internal situation of the country then called Dahomey was already chaotic in the
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years (1956 through 1972) immediately preceding and following the
independence in 1960 (Akindès, 1996).  “The country was deeply marked by all
the problems of a society in crisis political (successive coups d’état), social
(regionalism and nepotism) and economic. The drama of the Beninese society
was one of the relation between a people and a “modern” State entrenched in the
contradiction of an ongoing auto-determination and a historicity charged with a
heavy pre-colonial heritage” (46). For instance, the pre-colonial kingdoms of
Abomey, Porto-Novo and the Bariba kingdom resurge respectively in post-
colonial political leaders such as Justin Ahomadégbé, Sourou Migan Apithy and
Hubert Maga. The diversity and rivalry of old kingdoms, regions and ethnic
groups continue to keep the society torn. In the post Conference era of pluralism,
politicians and the multitude of political parties -120 and still counting –appeal to
tribal loyalties failing to devise a national political platform.
Postcolonial Benin gives the impression of a society experimenting with
the exaltation of new commencements as well as the discovery of its own
vulnerability. The colonizer is gone leaving behind a land sowed with enigmas
and withholding some of the keys indispensable to resolving them. In the
postcolony understood here as the period after colonization (Mbembe, 2000),
society does not have to suffer the colonial forms of humiliation, despise and
condescension. Yet, having now to take its own responsibility, the society ignores
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what it is as a society, what it wants, or where to start because it is a society
oriented for the main part outward (Hountondji, 1997).
Although Matthieu Kérékou had convened the National Conference,
participants declared their decisions would be binding, not advisory, and
stripped Kérékou of most of his power. The Conference flanked the President
Kérékou with Nicéphore D. Soglo as a prime minister during the period of
transition. During this period, a national referendum approved a new democratic
constitution in December 1990, permitting presidential elections in March 1991,
in which Nicéphore Soglo a former World Bank administrator, overwhelmingly
defeated Kérékou (Adamon, 1995).
Between that first democratic presidential election in 1991 and this late
date of 2004, much has happened. The technocrat Soglo lost his reelection
attempt to none other than the former military dictator, Kérékou, now in power
for his second term. This gave the impression that the new democratic era is
going backward and that the strong “emotions” of the Conference (de Souza,
1994) may well be dissipating. Nevertheless, the nation has regularly completed
relatively democratic elections –legislative, presidential, and even the first local
elections in 2003. If numbers are any indication, Benin has moved from a single
party state during the years of Marxist Revolution to 110 political parties in the
current era of pluralism –nothing short of an excess. The temptation of excess
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also produced unparalleled exploration of the newly found freedoms of speech
and opinion. To date, the media landscape comprises two TV stations, 36 radio
stations, 43 periodicals and 17 daily papers for a readership less than a million
people (ODEM, 2001).
Yet, a small minority of Western-educated elites still control public affairs
and any hope of participative “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984) and economic
prosperity for the many belongs to a “horizon of expectation [that] withdraws
from us faster than we can advance toward it” (Ricoeur 1990, 213). Although the
National Conference leading to the creation of constitutional and institutional
framework for democracy has not evolved into a habitual public dialogue or
practices of sustained common actions, it remains the major guiding reference in
the collective consciousness (Banégas, 2003). That is, the National Conference
constitutes one of the rare occasions the national community experienced
dialogically its collective history for itself as opposed to obeying to colonial or
neocolonial “command” (Mbembe, 2001) coming from outside. In fact, the
dialogue of the National Conference is a public example of the “communicative
praxis” framed by Schrag (1989) as a texture of discourse and action experienced
by someone, for someone and about something. From the between, the Conference
is then a temporally and situationally lived experience textured with discourse
and action by the people of Benin, about Benin and for the the people of Benin. By
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tending as such to what emerges as their between the Beninese develop a critical
conscience about their lived experience. The contribution of this research to the
scholarship on the National Conference comes from the capacity of the Buberian
anthropological philosophical dialogue to read the signs of the kairotic moment
emerging out of the Beninese between. Before any feather developing, the
following section gives account of the prevailing interpretations of the
Conference.
III. Interpretations
The choice of the National Conference as a case study is based on
the opportunity it offers to explore the communicative participation of the
intellectual Akowé in public dialogue in Benin. As it turns out, the kind of
literature available about the Conference is indicative of the communicative
praxis of the Akowé in a culture of silence where they have the exclusive
monopoly of literature production and consumption. After a remark on the
nature of scholarship in a culture of silence, the section discusses the scholarship
of the Conference by focusing on the following successive themes: the external
factors, the local actors, the local dynamics and the models of interpretation.
A. Scholarship in a Culture of Silence
The tragedy of a culture of silence is the inability of a culture to speak
itself, to find its own words in order to transform its own world (Freire, 2000).
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However, as it opts to interpret the National Conference as a public dialogue,
this research shows that with the Conference, Benin was able to speak its own
word, no matter how timidly. Unfortunately, most of the studies of the
Conference are conducted as a scholarship marked by the culture of silence. They
fail to tend to the dialogic event of a communicative community finding its own
voice and experiencing its own endogenous historicity with a fuzzy clarity.  That
is, they fail to account for the emergence of a genuine and spontaneous between
that is a social formation in the unity of contraries (Friedman, 1996) of a
communicative reality that goes beyond the intentions and opinions of the
participants (Deetz, 1999, 146).  To understand the limits of the scholarship of the
National Conference, it is necessary to keep in mind the limitations the culture of
silence places on scholarship.
In his account of the postcolonial situation Mbembe (2000) convincingly
points out that discourses and practices of social transformation in various
disciplines such as politics, development, economy and mass media are
controlled by “theories of social evolutionism and ideologies of development and
modernization” (7). He goes on to explain:
Mired in the demands of what is immediately useful, enclosed in the narrow
horizon of “good governance” and the neo-liberal catechism about the market
economy, torn by the current fads for “civil society,” “conflict resolution,” and
alleged “transitions to democracy,” the discussion, as habitually engaged, is
primarily concerned, not with comprehending the political in Africa or with
producing knowledge in general, but with social engineering. As a general rule,
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what is stated is dogmatically programmatic; interpretations are almost cavalier,
and what passes for argument is almost always reductionist. The criteria that
African agents accept as valid, the reasons they exchange within their own
instituted rationalities are, to many, of no value. What African agents accept
as reasons for acting, what their claim to act in the light of reason implies (as
general claim to be right, avoir raison), what makes their action intelligible to
themselves: all this is of virtually no account in the eyes of analysts. 7
The inadequacy of this kind of scholarship to comprehend the “political” in the
fundamental sense of living together in Africa constitutes a serious concern.
From a communicative perspective, it is a scholarship of a culture of silence
because it creates a world of systematic and pervasive silencing of the
intelligibility in the action and speech of the Africans for themselves and for
others.
Considering specifically the interpretations of the National Conference,
Eboussi Boulaga (1993) has warned of the limits of the culture of silence. In his
landmark essay, Les Conférences Nationales en Afrique Noire: une Affaire à Suivre, he
has warned that in order to let unfold the potential of the National Conference,
its interpretations must avoid what he calls a “preemption of its meaning” (1993,
19). In the most part, the interpretations of the National Conference have not
been able to resist this “preemption of its meaning,” this silencing of its
intelligibility. Besides the works that chronicle the proceedings of the Conference
(Fondation Friedrick Naumann, Gbado, Adamon, 1995), the discussion now
focuses on the works that offer interpretations of the Conference, organizing the
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ideas around external factors, local actors, local dynamics and models of
anthropological interpretations.
B. External Factors
Some commentators deem simple a myth the historical significance of the
National Conference in Benin and the ensuing democratization process. This
myth leads the people to believe that the nation invented the National
Conference, while in reality the Conference was imposed on Benin from the
outside, namely from France, its former colonial metropolis (Akindès, 1996). For
sure, France’s habitual meddling in Francophone Africa’s internal affairs has
something to do with the organization of the Conference. To support this
contention, researchers have quoted an official correspondence between
President Matthieu Kérékou’s chief of staff and Mr. Guy Azais, the ambassador
of France in Benin during the period of the deep social and political crisis leading
to the National Conference (Adamon, 1995). This official correspondence dated
December 7, 1989, made it clear to Kérékou that the French party requires and
offers to finance a constitutional reform and the organization in February of the
following year of some kind of national convention or “Etats Généraux” (Sates
General; 22-23). This direct influence of France in the organization of the
National Conference makes plausible the case that the Conference was nothing
else than a renewed and more subtle form of the same exogenous historicity that
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continues to dominate “time as lived” (Mbembe, 2000), discourse and action in
post-colonial countries.
Most of the writings on the National Conference are good at showing that
the event of the National Conference participates in Africa’s “exogenous
historicity” dominated by Western times and rhythm of life (Bayart, 1993). They
connect the National Conference and the 1990’s democratization movement in
Africa to the “collapse of the Cold War that deprived most African regimes of
international patrons who desired to use them to pursue geopolitical goals”
(Karp & Masolo, 2000, 176). According to this interpretation, the 1990’s winds of
democratization in Sub-Sahara Africa have blown from East Europe after the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet block. In the same line of
interpretation, in the emerging post Cold War world order, democratization
became a condition for financial assistance led primarily by the World Bank and
the IMF. The exaggeration of these external international factors supports the
view that France is the determinant instigator of the organization of the National
Conference of Benin.
The preemption of the meaning is not only possible through a strategy of
interpretation from outside, however, but also from within. Therefore, it is as
important to discuss the preemption from the outside as it is to interpret it from
within, because the description of the culture of silence and of the Akowé
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(intellectual) elite as communicative silencer is connected to both external factors
and local actors.
C. Local Actors
The interpretations of the local actors of the National Conference concern
themselves with numerous questions worth investigating. How representative
are the 493 participants of the Conference? How democratic is their choice? How
problematic is the fact that during the proceedings, the intellectual Akowé control
the discussions, as most of the peasants and artisans are unable to speak French
and do not know anything about issues such as constitutionality or economic
policies? Notwithstanding the importance of these concerns, the interpretations
of local actors are fraught with a serious oblivion as the following discussion
suggests.
When social commentators discuss the roles of local actors in the
organization of the National Conference, they quickly pit one group of social
actors against others. As the examples discussed below demonstrate, these social
commentators share the either/or logic of rationalist and modern thinking,
whereas the dialogic framework of this research moves beyond such restriction
in a attempt to account to the paradox, complexity and concreteness of public
life.
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In La Démocratie au Bénin: Bilan et Perspectives, Philippe Noudjenoumin
(1999) provides a very telling example of this positioning:
A purely discursive or semiologic reading of the democratization process in Benin
limited to the dominant spheres leads necessarily to an over-determination of the
role played in the transformations occurred in our country by Kérékou, the Head
of State and by political personalities like Bishop de Souza, the Chairman of the
Conference. This approach is very frequent among the political scientists and
constitutionalits who dominate the world is a scientific lie […] The advent of
democracy or pluralism in Benin is the fruit of a daily struggle intense and
unwavering by a civil society led during that period by the Communist Party of
Dahomey (167).
This argument deserves serious attention as it goes beyond a simply communist
point of view to  point to to the phenomenon of mutual silencing existing in
various forms of interpretations that strengthen from within the culture of
silence.
As he critiques the “discursive or semiologic” reading of the Conference,
the invocation of the struggle of the civil society and the peasantry serves
Noudjenoumin as an interpretive pretext to claim the significance of the role
played by the leadership of the Communist Party.  There is no need to dispute
the claim that in the events leading to the demise of Kérékou’s government,
Communists were engaged in inciting various clandestine insurrections against
the regime they call pseudo-Marxist. But the point to be contested here is
Noudjenoumin’s implication that Communists alone hold an exclusive
monopoly on understanding the solution for the nation’s crisis, without any
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vision for a political and participatory invention of a community solution. This
goes to show something that Noudjenoumin has overlooked in his analysis: the
leadership of the “Partie Communiste du Dahomey” (PCD) is not outside of
what the author calls the “dominant spheres” of influence. If anything, his
strategy of interpretation mirrors the political radicalism of the Communist
leaders who set themselves off against the other leaders, to the point that when,
almost the whole of Benin sent, albeit hesitatingly, representatives to the
Conference, The PCD remained the sole exception to claim adamantly that the
Conference is a dupery, “un marché de dupes” (Noudjenoume, 1999). It is
tempting to dwell on the contradictions of the PCD and its advocates. After its
absence at the Conference and the democratic transition, the PCD has
significantly lost its local political relevance in spite of Communist advocates of
the types of Noudjenoume. However, it amounts to a mutual silencing to
counter-attack Noudjenoume’s critique with another critique of the same nature.
What is the point of distributing blames or settling scores among local
actors as long as the analyses are unable to interpret the historical moment of the
Conference with its intelligibility and its meaning? The point in consideration
here is not that authors hold different points of view in the interpretation of the
Conference. Besides their contradictory ideologies, those who belong to the
“dominant spheres” often fail to put to the service of the Beninese between their
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ability of scholarly production of the type of Noudjenoume’s volume or this
dissertation. Because they fail to tend to a by, about and for in their scholarly
endeavor, they silence each other and the “silenced communities,” which is
particularly unable anyway to access let alone participate in an academic
elaboration. Although a critical assessment of the roles played by social, political
and religious actors in Benin’s peaceful transition to democracy is useful,
interpretations typically fall short of accounting insightfully for the fact that the
Conference brought together in a novel public dialogue a mosaic of Beninese
from different walks of life and political persuasions both adversaries and
strangers. Missing then from the literature is the interpretation of the historical
moment that emerged bigger than separate fractions with no one able to claim its
sole ownership or authorship, while it challenges everyone to rise to the
occasion.
For sure, there are many things wrong with exaggerated blame or
grandiloquent praises of Kérékou or Bishop de Souza, or the Communist Party of
Dahomey. That other National Conferences, such as that of Togo, which have
failed in their attempt to imitate the Conference of Benin has sadly proven the
danger of excessive although justified accusations and blames of one another and
chiefly of the regime in place. The crucial point here is that the National
Conference is not about who is right, not even who did what or who invented
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the term “Conference National des Forces Vives de la Nations.” The scholarship
on the Conference cannot be about whose interpretation wins the war of
academic argument. The National Conference is about what it means to keep the
conversation going about the nation in spite of differences, contradictions and
doubts. The scholarship on the Conference should be about keeping alive the
spirit of the Conference in the between. By failing to do this, the interpretations of
the roles of actors in the National Conference suffer then from a problem of
misdirected phenomenologic focus of attention. As opposed to a focus of
interpretation on personal or ideological agenda, the dissertation points to an
articulation of the by of scholarship that acknowledges the limitation its
situatedness in the culture of silence while focusing on the about and the for of the
research.  In addition to the discussion of the local actors, the interpretations of
the local dynamics at work in the organization of the National Conference suffers
from the same misguided focus of attention.
D. Local dynamics
The discussion in the literature of the local dynamics at work in the
National Conference gives a clear indication of how determinant is the
phenomenologic focus of attention, that is, as Eboussi Boulaga (1993) puts it, “the
look” projected on the Conference, “the orientation of eyes and thoughts” (16).
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One illustration of this comes from a text worth quoting in its original French as
it illustrates how a misguided phenomenologic focus of attention ends up
silencing the local dynamics of tradition, culture and society.
Par cette tendance à l’extension incontrolée, la tradition se pose en s’opposant
au changement. Le pari de l’avenir consiste à en limiter l’expression. Il ne faut
plus laisser la culture africaine, dans ses manifestations primaires, gérer le
progrès; c’est plutot de l’inverse que naitra un autre type de société. Au plan
politique, par exemple, elle ne peut pas aider à la consolidation des libertés
démocratiques si on ne lui fait pas violence. Elle a une force de résistance
nuisible à la nécessaire adaptation des sociétés face à la modernité; raison pour
laquelle elle doit etre domptée et politiquement réorientée.
As it tends to extend without control, tradition posits itself in opposition to
change. The challenge of the future consists in limiting its expression. For the
birth of a different type of society, African culture, in its primitive manifestations
cannot control progress. It should be the other way around. At the political level
for example, African culture is unable to consolidate democratic liberties without
undergoing violence. It has a capacity of resistance harmful to the indispensable
adaptation of societies facing modernity. This requires that African culture
be tamed and politically reoriented.
One would have hoped that such deliberate project of blatant violence on the
African social and cultural dynamics originated from Conrad’s Heart of Darkness
or Truman’s Fair Deal speech, which after WWII, launched the vast
modernization project of “under-developed nations.” A tabula rasa of their
tradition was the condition sine qua non for these nations to become modern.  As
it turns out unfortunately, the author of these lines is the sociologist Francis
Akindès (1996, 211) writing in the series of the influential Council for the
Development of Social Sciences Research in Africa (CODESRIA).
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This is unfortunate because in his volume, Akindès acknowledges
the importance of historicity, of local construction of democracy and even of
endogenous culture, which goes to show that the challenge of interpretation in a
culture of silence does not depend on the kind of ideas one proffers only. It is a
problem of “orientation of eyes and thoughts.” What is problematic in Akindès’
interpretation is not the content of his work but its failure to account for a by,
about and for situated in and constituting a Beninese between. Besides the noted
inconsistencies in his argument Akindès’ phenomenologic focus of attention is
misguided. As a result, the National Conference becomes for him a simple
mirage as his interpretation is unable to account for the intelligibility of the local
dynamics at work in the National Conference.
E. Models of Interpretations
In addition to the ways of interpreting external factors, local actors and
local dynamics, the various approaches or models of interpretation of the
Conference demonstrate a profound malaise in the understanding of the
Conference. Some researchers compare the National Conference of Benin with
the one in Togo (Houngnikpo, 2001) or with the one in Niger (Frère, 2000). Other
interpretations compares the Conference to other historical references such the
French Etats-Généraux. Due to the philosophical anthropological perspective of
this Buber-inspired interpretation of public dialogue, the following discussion
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interprets first the anthropological models of interpretation of the Conference
and then focus on “palabre,” an example of anthropological interpretation
(Banégas, 2003; Bidima, 1997)
1. Anthropological interpretations
Banégas (2003) claims that the public space actuated by the Conference is
less concerned about institutional arrangements or formal procedures of
deliberations than it is about political imaginery. For him, to understand the
Conference without “preempting its meaning,” the interpretation needs to
become a symbolic analysis accounting for the power of evocation and the
mythical significance of the Conference. To date, Eboussi Boulaga has given
according to this author, the most profound, albeit incomplete, example of such
analysis.
In his landmark study of the Conference, Fabien Eboussi Boulaga (1993)
considers the Conference as a founding act and resorts to anthropology to
suggest frames of interpretation that he invites future researchers to develop,
including feast, game, therapy, “palabre” and initiation (145-161). Eboussi
Boulaga’s intuition is worth a studied attention. For him, the National
Conference is not a technique of public deliberation easily imitable or repeatable.
The National Conference does something novel to the African discomfiture that
comes from the loss or break-down of the mythical-ethical nucleus (Ricoeur
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quoted by Eboussi Boulaga, 1993), which from within a culture or civilization
provides laws, institutions, and behaviors with their proper meaning and inner
logic (163). The National Conference is a “commencement” or a
“recommencement,” an invention or a reinvention of this mythical-ethical
nucleus of African cultures faced with the historical challenge of modernizing
without denying themselves. This challenge of the relation between tradition and
modernity has been badly handled by the postcolonial situation, the
modernization projects and the development programs in which local traditions
and cultures are considered as the causes of underdevelopment and must be
annihilated. The National Conference opens up to the reinvention of the
endogenous nucleus as it puts up an intense dialogue by the people of Benin for
the people of Benin and about Benin (172). To illustrate the potential of an
interpretation learning to resist the preemption of the Conference’s meaning, the
discussion now focuses on the understanding of the Conference as a “palabre.”
This serves as a prelude to the public dialogue approached advocated here.
2. Palabre
Researchers claim that African pre-colonial political systems had as part of
the mythical-ethical nucleus some inclusive and participatory features that could
have modeled post-colonial Africa differently (Bidima, 1997; Banégas, 2003;
Hazoume, ). One example is the practice of public communication called
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“palabre” in Francophone Africa and “palaver” in Anglophone Africa
(Houngnikpo, 2001, 86). “Palabre” is the Spanish “palabra” (word) that in French
is used as the derogatory term for the word “parole.” In French-speaking Africa,
palabre has been used to designate a verbal confrontation between adversaries
who gather with the community around the “tree of palaver” (l’arbre à palabre)
for peaceful resolution of conflicts involving land disputes and domestic
arguments (Banégas, 2003, 165; see also Bidima, 1997).
Of course, the National Conference did not gather the entire national
community of Benin around a tree and the grievances, although they include
personal conflicts and ethnic tensions, reach a national proportions and touch the
very question of the survival of the nation itself. Contrary to the practice of old,
the palabre of the National Conference took place in a hotel with 493
representatives deliberating according to some Western-like rules and
procedures developed for the occasion and speaking in French for the most part
(Fondation Friedrick Naumann, ; Adamon, 1995). Besides, none of the 40-some
cultures comprising the nation resonate with palabre, which in its classical form
is a Bantu practice rather than a Beninese one. That is, invoking the concept of
palabre to interpret the National Conference requires an important reserve. It is
important to warn against overgeneralizations of the type made by Houngnikpo
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(2001) who claims about “palabre” that “when Benin came up with the idea of
National Conference the leadership was simply going back to history” (86).
As far as a relation to history is concerned, the palabre of the National
Conference only pulls from some cultural heritage (Eboussi Boulaga, 1993)
reclaimed for a communicative invention that meets the challenges of a specific
historical moment of Benin in 1990. This evolving cultural residual is shared
differently by most African cultures and other oral cultures and consists in the
belief that a community can talk and act together its way through crisis. In this
restricted sense, the popular conscience in Benin resonates with palabre as belief
and practice of the performance of public conversation. The Conference and its
scholarship (Banégas, 2003) have invoked additively another local cultural
practice, that of “going to ajalalassa.”
When the Fon people from Abomey (Benin) “go to ajalalassa,” the family
meet in the family room to talk over grievances and crisis and by doing so
believe they contribute to social cohesion (Banégas, 2003). With the interpretive
keys like palabre or ajalalassa, the core of any interpretation willing to avoid the
preemption of Conferenc’s meaning needs to account for a whole nation finding
a way to come together, with its members facing and engaging each other
dialogically. The National Conference is a new kind of palabre, a new kind of
“jalalassa” that surely resonates with the cultural heritage without fearing to
106
borrow some Western procedures of deliberation to invent dialogically a
communicative practice that meets the historical moment.  The adaptation of the
evolving cultural residual that materialized in speeches and even in the erection
of public monuments after the Conference is the “ajalala zin,” the ritual jar.
“Ajalala zin” is a powerful metaphor that directs the focus of attention, not on
the participant in communication, but on something else, which is between them
while being of them. This visualization of a between in communication justifies
the choice of a Buber-inspired interpretation of public dialogue to capitalize on
the insights of “palabre” and “ajalala zin” while supplementing the limits of the
interpretations of external factors, local actors and local dynamics of Conference.
Additionally, the interpretation of the Conference as a public dialogue will be
required to take a stand on issues of justice, equality, and pluralism in the
National Conference.
Because they place the focus of attention on the power of the word shared
and the common jar of the community, palabre and “ajalala zin” already have
the potential for accounting for justice, equality and pluralism in the Conference
(Banégas, 2003). They liberate to some extent the possibilities for contradictory
debate while they still carry inequalities in societies with feudal traditons. For
example, Banégas says: “What is crucial in the palabre, is to reconstitute the
game of reciprocity in the exchanges that are major in the foundation of socio-
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political order” (168). He adds in accord with Eboussi Boulaga that the word that
engages has a constitutive role. Consequently, it is not enough to keep the
conversation going, but a conversation that engages the participants and struggle
as on a rocky ridge between justice and pluralism, equality and social order. A
conversation that does not sacrifice social order to the justice of the individual,
neither sacrifices some individual to the maintenance of social order in a society
that was hierarchical and monarchal in the pre-colonial time and is still led by
the “big men,” who are “monologic participants,” according the metaphor
developed in this research.
Anthropological frames of interpretation could be better at avoiding the
preemption of the meaning of the Conference if they account for its emergence of
happening as a community communicative invention for a specific historical
moment. Because this research suggests that a philosophical anthropological
interpretation of a Buber-inspired conception of participatory public dialogue
affords an even more insightful occasion to pay heed to the National Conference,
the following section interpret the Conference as a public dialogue.
V. The National Conference as a Public Dialogue
The interpretation of public dialogue in chapter two has provided the
research with the theoretical tools able to suggest a novel interpretation of the
National Conference as a public dialogue conceived according to Buber’s theory
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of dialogue. The research relies on the definition of Kenneth N. Cissna and Rob
Anderson (2002, 11) who draw their conception of public dialogue from Buber’s
work. They suggest that such public dialogue rejects the position
sketched by Lippman’s efficient bureaucracy of planners in favor of the
messier process by which Dewey trusted communities to talk a future into
existence by fits and starts. When a space somehow is cleared for dialogue
and when sincere communicators expect and invite it, we glimpse futures
that could not have been available or even imagined beforehand.
They go on to explain that such public dialogue can happen between two people,
within a small group or a whole community. The interpretation offered here
describe the National Conference according to five main features of a public
dialogue in a first section. In a second section, the interpretation develops in
depth the Buber’s beween of the Conference as a public dialogue.
A. Features of Public Dialogue
In this first section, the discussion develops five different
dimensions of a Buber-inspired public dialogue and demonstrates the insight
they bring into "interpreting otherwise" (Manning ) the National Conference
without preempting its meaning. These features of public dialogue include
public dialogue as a messy activity; trust, hope and realism in public dialogue;
and public dialogue that talks a future into existence.
1. Public Dialogue is Messy
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First, the National Conference is a public dialogue unfolding as a messy
activity that develops a trust in the ability of the national community to talk a
future into existence by fits and starts. In spite of the presence of sophisticated
rules of procedure, in spite of the election of a presidium with Archbishop
Isidore de Souza as its chair, in spite of the creation of three committees dealing
with economic and social issues, culture and education, and constitutional issues
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994), the debates turn out to be poorly orderly,
without direction and at times outright confused. By the third day of the
Conference, the tongues silenced for 17 years of dictatorship were gathering up
the courage to speak out. The subsequent denunciation of Kérékou’s regime can
be described as anything but a choreographed public dialogue. Increasingly,
participants are fuming in all directions, denouncing corruption, tribalism,
violation of public and civil liberties, deficient educational systems, fraudulent
banking systems, censure of the media, meddling of the military in public life,
meddling of the State in the judicial powers and the exclusion of women from
public life (5).
Then on February 24th, the fourth day of the Conference, the discussions
take a bold turn. They challenge the mission of the Conference intended by
Kérékou to be nothing more than a consultative meeting allowing him to
appease the anger of the oppressed population and providing him with concrete
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suggestions to put an end to the national crisis. To Kérékou’s surprise and much
to the anger of his loyalists, most of the participants consider the idea of turning
the Conference into a Constituent Assembly with the capacity to decide for a
new legitimacy (6). At this point, the tension in the Conference hall rise to its
highest level. Kérékou has already forbidden the Conference to go in that
direction. Now, the former president Maurice Kouandoté, known during the
early years after the independence as a specialist of coup d’état, gives the
assembly an ultimatum of two weeks to carry on a coup de force and storms out
of the Conference. Justin Ahomadédé, another former president, asks the
Conference to take seriously Kouandoté’s threat. On behalf of the military, the
colonel Vincent Guézodjè opposed as well what he calls coup d’état. It goes
without saying that fear and panic seize the assembly and trickle down to the
whole nation. In the height of the suspense of the intensive day of Saturday,
February 24, no camp holds for sure the strings of history.
2. Public Dialogue of Trust, Hope and Realism
The second feature of a Buber-inspired interpretation of the Conference as
a public dialogue shows that, although at times the National Conference comes
dangerously close to bloodshed, it manages to have some kind of trust in public
dialogue informed by realism and hope. This makes the difference between the
National Conference of Benin and all the other subsequent National Conferences
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in Togo, Niger, Gabon, Zaire (then), Congo between 1990 and 1991 and Tchad
later in 1993 (Akindès, 1996, 61). It is unrealistic to think that all the participants
trust each other during the debates. The evidence points rather to the fact that in
spite of all the fears, threats and the tanks in position of combat in from the Hotel
Aledjo-PLM, the Conference as a whole never lost trust in the process of public
dialogue.
In fact, on that Saturday, February 24th, when talks become serious enough
for the Conference to exceed its simply consultative mission by becoming a
sovereign, constituent assembly, Kérékou makes an unexpected appearance into
the Conference hall. On that night, at 10:40 P.M. he has a private conversation
with the Chair of the Presidium, Archbishop Isidore de Souza.  The only thing he
allows to be known after the private conversation with the prelate was his
reminder to the assembly to focus on economic rather than political issues.
However, it looks at this point, like nothing is going to deter the determination of
the participants to the Conference. On Sunday, February 24 called “Victory
Sunday,” the participants vote on what they called the sovereignty of the
Conference with the exception of the 17 voices of representative close to Kérékou
and his Socialist Party. At that historic moment of the proclamation of the
sovereignty of the Conference, the audience breaks into applause and chanting.
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A voice begins signing the national anthem, “Enfants du Bénin debout,” and the
whole Conference joins in singing:
Children of Benin get up
Freedom, at the first ray of the dawn
Sings with a resounding voice
Children of Benin get up
The assembly stands up unified in spite of the dignitaries of the now obsolete
regime seated to express their disagreement.
Later that day of “Victory Sunday,” Kérékou makes one more appearance
in the Conference hall and declares:
If this is a coup d’états, your decisions do not engage us. We cannot resign. You
can destitute us. We cannot use public means to oppress the people. We cannot
write a Constitution in the blood. It is about time to put an end to coups d’états
civil and military. I cannot envision a resignation. Some people may be of the
opinion that we have betrayed. In the name of the Bible, in the name of Jesus-
Christ, be enlightened. May the Holy Spirit be with you. (10)
Besides the fact that this professional military man has never had the best public
speaking skills in his 17 years as president, this declaration shows him even more
confused than usual. No one knows for sure what to make of it. At the very least,
this remark means that Kérékou, who has the military force at his disposal, and
in spite of rumors of dictators from nearby countries willing to back him in an
eventual use of force, is allowing the Conference to proceed. The suspense
remains about the final outcome of the proceedings. The participants only have
to hope for the best continue their work of public dialogue. However, the truth of
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the matter remains that a dictator who loses his legitimacy can still resort use of
force if he still controlls the military as does Kérékou. The Conference takes the
precaution of providing Kérékou and his regime with some guarantee, such as
the clause of the amnesty given to him. The Conference flanked Kérékou with a
Prime Minister, Nicéphore Soglo, elected by the participants to oversee a year of
transition during which a new democratic Constitution will be written and the
first democratic presidential and legislative elections will be organized. Without
the power of force, the Conference holds onto the trust in dialogue to combine
the hope for a democratic renewal with realism and completes its work in ten
days.  The suspense lives on until the closing of the Conference when Kérékou
proclaims these historic words:
Today, Wednesday, February 28th, 1990 we call to witness the entire people of
Benin to affirm solemnly our engagement to put into action in realistic manner
all the decisions of the National Conference of the Living Forces of the Nation
(Fondation Friedrick Naumann, 1994, 111).
By these historic words, the National Conference makes history according to the
account of most participants. The entire nation of Benin resists the temptation to
seize the weapons and methods of violence and learns to talk its way into a
democratic future.  [I see how you are employing trust, hope, and realism here.
Can you return again to the scholars in conversation with your project and lend
their perspectives more intensely and deeply to what is described here?  Just a
114
couple of paragraphs that permit their work to texture and frame this description
would be helpful.]
3. Public Dialogue Talks a Future into Existence
The third feature interprets the Conference as public dialogue that talks a
future into existence. The ways “communities talk a future into existence” is not
limited to speech. Cissna & Anderson (2004, 196) add that public dialogue
“identifies the attitudes with which participants approach each other, the ways
they talk and act, the consequences of their meeting, and the context within
which they meet.” The interpretation of the National Conference as a public
dialogue is different from a study of conversation, speech act or public address.
As a public dialogue, the National Conference is a foundation of dialogic
invention, a basic form of democratic conversation that thrives less on the
expertise of the few than on the trust in a dialogue enabling the participative
inclusion of the complex array of communication patterns, cultural frameworks
and moral orders that exist within a pluralistic community at any given time
(Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997; Strike, 1994).  In public dialogue, participation calls
each member and diverse communicative patterns and moral orders “to be a
part, take a part, and have a part (Bordenave, 1994, 37) of a new Benin emerging
as a “conversational society” (Anderson & al., 1996). It is this participatory
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feature of the public dialogue that this work captures with the metaphor of
participatory public dialogue.
B. The Central Feature of Public Dialogue: the Between
The central feature that this research takes from Buber’s theory of
dialogue is the concept of between. The following discussion connects between
with the scholarship of the National Conference, then with the “common world
of speech and beings” (Buber) and finally with the historical moment.
1. Between and Research on the National Conference
Buber’s anthropological philosophy of dialogue guides this
communication research into an interpretive listening of the intellectual Akowé’s
communicative praxis in participatory public dialogue. As such, the research does
not focus on the subjectivity of the Akowé, but on their communicative praxis
interpreted out of the between of “man with man” (Buber). By virtue of the
between, anthropological philosophy is a “philosophy of the interhuman”
(Friedman, 16) in Benin. Buber believes “that science itself was based upon Thou
–actual intuitions of Thou, but the elaboration had to do with the It” (Friedman,
5). That is, the I-Thou relation of genuine dialogue exceeds scientific methods
because its horizon is limited to an I-It relation of technological dialogue. The
preemption of the Conference’s meaning (Eboussi Boulaga, 1993) is prevalent in
the literature because of failure to pay attention to this distinction. The
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“happening” of public dialogue at the Conference is based upon actual intuitions
of Thou but the academic exploration necessarily establishes a technical relation
with such genuine dialogue. The interpretive listening is offered in this research
as an approach able to pay heed to the between. Following Buber, the research
interprets the public dialogue with metaphors that only “point the way” to an I-
Thou reality that exceed the language, although language itself contributes to the
experience.
The interpretive listening that pays heed to the between does not aim at the
construction of knowledge as a goal sufficient in itself. As Buber states, "I have
occasionally described my standpoint to my friends as the 'narrow ridge.' I
wanted by this to express that I did not rest on the broad upland of a system that
includes a series of sure statements about the absolute, but on a narrow rocky
ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible knowledge but
the certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed" (Between Man and Man,
1947). The public dialogue of the National Conference requires an interpretive
endeavor that meets what remains undisclosed. It is the view of this research that
the comfortable position on the broad upland of a system has led most of the
researches on the National Conference to preempt its meaning, preferring a
series of sure statements. The contribution of this research is to place itself on the
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“narrow rocky ridge” for an interpretive listening (Fiumara) with no sureness of
expressible knowledge.
2. The Between as Common World of Speech and Beings
Buber, the between is an ontological site of the interhuman crossed by both
relation and distance between the I and the Thou. The relation between the I and
the Thou never comes to a fusion, not even in the most genuine dialogue. At the
same time, however, the distance of I from Thou does not mean a separation of
one from the other. As such, this double movement of distance and relation
constitutes the between, which for this reason is also called the “interhuman.” This
ontological between and interhuman is distance, relation and concrete presence
through mutual confirmation.
In the extension of the between of into public dialogue, the I-Thou is
expressed and experience as a We, the Essential We, in a way that interpersonal
dialogue and public dialogue reinforce each other mutually. For Buber, "man has
always had his experiences as I, his experiences with others, his experiences with
himself; but it is as We, ever again as We that he has constructed and developed
a world out of his experiences." It is as a We that men have built "a common
world of speech and a common order of beings." The between in public dialogue
is the ontological site crossed with the double movement of distance and relation
and out of which emerge the common world of speech and the common order of
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beings. The country of Benin drawn on the map by the colonizers has never felt a
sense of We as it does through the public dialogue of the Conference. The
incredible passion (de Souza, 199?) felt by a people coming together through
public dialogue is well captured when people refer to the Conference saying:
“we have won” [nous avons gagné] (Adamon, 1995). The  National Conference is
a public dialogue that affords the participants and the nation the possibility of
tending to the between emerging in their midst as the “win over fatality.”
 The Conference has illustrated a public dialogue interrupted or
cumulated with intense interpersonal dialogue, such the crucial dialogues
between Kérékou and the Archbishop Isidore de Souza. This connection between
interpersonal and public dialogue (Arnett and Arneson, 1999) inspires this
research to combine concerns with participatory communication and issues of
public dialogue in an attempt to show as Buber says that only men and women
who are capable of truly saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one
another.  It seems clear that during the National Conference, technical and
monologic I-It dialogue takes place more commonly than a genuine I-Thou
interpersonal and public dialogue. But the key to the Conference is to understand
that in spite of the more common I-It dialogue a between emerges with and out of
moments of I-Thou dialogues. In fact, I-Thou in the between constitutes the ideal
communication of reciprocity and symmetry whose anticipation and
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presumption make any human communication possible (Deetz, 1999) and which
carries within it the potential to hold democratic societies together. It is the
emergence, the happening of this ideal genuine dialogic communication that
most research on the National Conference has failed to account for.  Researches
fail to meet what is still undisclosed because it is more than the procedure put in
place during the National Conference, it more than the speeches and even more
significant than the democratic laws and institutions that emerge from the
transition period following the Conference. The public dialogue is a “happening”
of a historical moment. Without understanding and experiencing this historical
moment all the gains of the Conference will be lost.
C. The Historical Moment in the Between
This interpretation places the between of the Conference against the
backdrop of the historicity of a post-colonial Africa that remains victim of the
violence and imperialism in “Western philosophy” (Levinas, 1999) and the
“uncompromising nature of the Western self and the active negation of anything
not itself” (Mbembe, 2001, 12). Africa stands out more than any other region “as
the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and circular discourse
about, the facts of “absence,” “lack,” and “non-being,” of identity and difference,
of negativeness –in short, of nothingness” (4). Central in this “unreality” of the
continent is the absence or lack of what Bayart (1993) calls the “true historicity of
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African societies.” This is not to say that the West carries solely the blame of
postcolonial Africa’s problems. As Mbembe explains further, the fact of the
matter is that ever since the fifteenth century contact with Western explorers and
subsequent colonizers, “there is no longer a 'distinctive historicity' of these
[African] societies, one not embedded in times and rhythms heavily conditioned
by European domination” (9).
During this temporally and situationally endogenous public dialogue by
the Beninese, for the Beninese and about Benin (Schrag, 1989), the experience of
historicity was not so much a linear free flow of speech, action and lived time as
it was a number of fleeting epiphanies describable as glimpses in visual
metaphor, traces in topographic metaphor, occurrences in temporal metaphor
and echoes in audio metaphor. In Buber’s terminology, this historical moment
represents a happening of genuine I-Thou encountering in the between of public
dialogue. The Conference itself describes this dialogic meeting as a crucible
(creuset), meaning a metaphoric locus to fire up –like a metal molded into a fire –
and transform the nation for a “renewal.” Better yet, the Conference recuperated
and reinvented an analogy originally attributed to the Abomey King Guézo ( ): If
all the children of the country were to plug the holes of the punctured calabash
(jar) with their fingers, we will save the nation, as the calabash can hold the water
that refreshes us (Adamon, 1995).
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The dissertation argues that within the undeniable dominance of
exogenous historicity (Akindès, 1996; Mbembe, 2000), the public dialogue of the
National Conference creates fleeting glimpses of historical moments occurring as
moments of genuine dialogue “textured” with words and deeds (Schrag, 1989)
and experienced by the people of Benin, for themselves and about Benin. This is a
humble claim focusing pointedly on traces and glimpses heavy with the past
brought to bear in the present and pregnant with new possibilities. Humble
claim, fleeting reality, yet powerful enough to mark the national conscience, to
represent a turning point in the history of Benin and set in motion the wind of
democratization in Africa in the 1990’s.
The between, the I-Thou, and the “happening” of historical moment points
to democratic experiences that do not find adequate expression in scholarship
marked by a culture of silence.
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 CHAPTER 4
COMMUNICATIVE SILENCER AGAINST PARTICIPATORY
 PUBLIC DIALOGUE
Où trouver des hommes nouveaux?  Adamon, 1995
Democratic communication presupposes the extreme of two situations. The first
situation is relative to the relation between dominated languages and dominating
languages. The second situation concerns the behavior between the illiterate
population and the literate, that is, those to whom education provides the skills
necessary to understand and dominate their living condition through writing
and reading.
Marc Laurent Hazoume, 1996
The theoretical awareness about the critical roles of participatory
communication and public dialogue that chapter one and chapter two bring to
the interpretation of the National Conference of Benin (chapter three) reveals that
the initial invention of Benin’s “democratic renewal” and its ongoing
democratization process find their inspiration and explication in the between.
That is, the between of the common “calabash” (jar) water, symbol of the living
together of the national community. According to an old analogy reinvented by
the National Conference, the punctured calabash is still able to contain the
common living water provided that all the children of the nation patch its holes
with their fingers. The participation of the constitution of the between is then
situated in this acknowledgment of the holes and breaches of contradictions,
differences and conflicts. The foreground consideration of the intellectual elite’s
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communicative praxis is dependent on this background of between made of
dialogic coming together of differences. Notwithstanding the historic National
Conference and the “democratic renewal,” the chapter claims that the character
of the elite Akowé is a communicative silencer whose communicative praxis
compromise participatory public dialogue by silencing the silenced majority.
For sure, in the democratic Benin, the drawing and the adoption of a
democratic constitution is remarkable. The installation of democratic institutions
of check and balance is a milestone confirmed by episodic presidential,
legislative and local elections. Yet, beyond or underneath this democratic
institutional achievements, the public dialogue invented by the National
Conference needs to become an everyday dialogic as opposed to being confined
into a constitutional script, calcified into hollow institutions or ritualized into
passing electoral dramas. When the question of broad participation in this
dialogic life is insightfully raised as does this research with its metaphor of
participatory public dialogue, the focus of the research concentrates on the most
preeminent participants, the powerful and the elites. From their midst, chapter
four concerns itself particularly with the intellectual Akowé and shows that in
spite of the democratic environment, their communicative praxis turns them into
“communicative silencers” of the “silenced communities.”
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The chapter shows first that every democracy tend to have its elites who
are against it. Then in a second point, the discussion place within the
acknowledgment of this democratic contradiction detailed as a “culture of
silence” (Freiere, 2000) the different characters including those who silence and
those who are silenced as together they tell the particular communicative story of
the national community. Consequently, the third section of the chapter focuses
on the particular character of the Akowé (intellectual) elite. Then the fourth
section describes the Akowé elite as the communicative silencer. Finally, the fifth
section describes the Akowé elite in the case study of the research as it interprets
the silencing communicative praxis of the communicative silencer during the
National Conference. 
I. Elites against Democracy
 The research focuses for sure on the Beninese intellectuals, locally called
Akowé. The chapter considers them precisely in their communicative control of
the articulation of social meaning in the young democracy. This discussion relies
on a critical understanding of democratic participation and searches to foster
public dialogue. Such a specific scope of the investigation echoes though a wider
problem in democratic experience. Every democracy, from ancient to modern
times, carries a tension between the proclaimed right of the people to reign and
the privilege of the well positioned to rule (Sagan, 1991). That is, “elites against
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democracy!” charges Good (2000). The discussion of the chapter develops as a
consideration of the disguised and unreflective opposition of the elites to
democracy. For this, the section revisits first the Greek democracy, then liberal
modern democracy.
In the democratic Athens, power was in the hands of rich elites (like
Pericles and his fellow slave-owners) who treated other power holders with
democratic deference. Although Athens’ agora and ekklesia and their public
debates constitute today the paradigmatic case of direct democracy, these elites
did not allow “the great majority of slaves, foreign workers, or women to enter
the exclusive circle of open discussion and majority voting” (Singh, 1992 45). In
his Politics, Aristotle explains: “the devices by which oligarchies deceive the
people are five in number… the assembly, the magistracies, the courts of law, the
use of arms, and gymnastic exercises.” All democratic societies have their
legislators, bureaucrats, generals, sophists and sports, who dominate the people.
Modern liberal democracies are no exception.
In modern liberal democracies, Walter Lippman (1922)  and John Dewey
(1927), Habermas (1989) and Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984), arguing from
antagonistic perspectives, make the common observation that the dominant
voices exclude the majority lacking technical, institutional, or financial resources.
This means that Aristotles’ legislators, bureaucrats, generals, sophists and sports
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have their similarities in the 21st century post-industrial societies, with elites
pushing their way into the charmed circle of representative democracy.
“Lipperman-like enclaves of technically educated elites” (Hauser 1999, 27) and
the wealthy reduce democracy to a “democracy of the few” (Michael Parenti,
1980), to “corporate colonization” (Deetz, 1992), to image and symbol control
(Jamieson) and “hegemony” (Gramsci). This research describes this phenomenon
of hegemony in democracy with Freire’s concept of a “culture of silence” for
three reasons. First the “culture of silence” is an existential situation of
domination more acute in “dominated societies,” such as Benin. Second, Freire’s
description suggests the situation exists as well in “dominant societies.” Third,
the concept points insightfully to communicative dimension of this hegemony as
a phenomenon of silencing.
This situation has led Good (2000) to assert that “from the handsome,
smiling Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, the saintly Nelson Mandela, the seemingly
benign Thabo Mbeki, and Festus Mogae,” the problem with culture of silence is
not chiefly of a technical and practical kind, but derives instead from the active
opposition of the democratic leaders. He calls it “elites against democracy.” This
active opposition of “elites against democracy” is according to the
communication perspective of this research, a “systematically distorted
communication” by “communicative silencers.” In the specific context of Benin,
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the Akowé (intellectual) elite constitute the character of the “communicative
silencers.”
II. Characters
In addition to presenting the culture of silence and communicative
silencing as a democratic problem common to ancient, and modern, old and
young democracies, the seriousness of the question becomes even more apparent
as the research takes the issue to the development experts, the elitist democrats,
and professionals. They are the intellectual elite who play the major roles in the
life of the nation and as they put their knowledge and expertise to public service,
they are limited in their conception and practice of communication to being
communicative silencers. The following interpretation of the intellectuals
considers first the characters that tell the story of the culture of silence. Second,
the interpretation describes the silenced characters, and third, it describes the
silencer character in this culture of silence.
A. Characters and Culture of Silence
The discussion describes the intellectuals as a character type among many
other types. According to MacIntyre (), “individuals” and “social roles” embody
differently cultural values: the former by way of their subjective intentions and
the later through objective social functions. Character type expresses and
embodies cultural values by fusing the individuals and social roles. A character
128
“furnishes them with a cultural and moral ideal.” The research finds interesting
not only MacIntrye’s description of character but also the connection he works
out between character types and the culture they shape. The author indicates that
“what is specific to each culture is in large and in its central part what is specific
to its stock of characters” (28). According to the context of MacIntyre’s essay,
characters of the aesthete, the manager, the therapist and the bureaucrat illustrate
what is specific in modern western culture. In the context of this interpretation
character types such as the Akowé, the Graduate without work, the “Third World
Country Woman” (Spivak) and the “Vidomègon,” that is, the child in slave work
(Agossou, 2000) tell a particular story of a culture of silence of a nation engaged
in a democratization process.
Among these character types that point to what is specific in the Beninese
culture of silence that compromise the strengthening of democracy and broad
participation in public dialogue, two distinctions are possible. The first
distinction consists of a group of characters with a communicative praxis that
generates and controls the silencing in the culture. They are a privileged minority
of citizens who are higher up on the social ladder because they control the power
to articulate social meaning (Barbero, 1993) and cultural truth (White). The
second distinction consists of characters who,  contrary to the first group, make
up the underprivileged communities, victim of this culture of silence.
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B. Silenced Characters
The lower levels and the bottom of the social ladder feature the majority
of underprivileged who are illiterate and/or poor and for that reason tend to
make up the character type of the silenced communities. In the dialogic life of the
young democracy, some people are able to say more than others. This per se is
not unique to Benin and actually it is not problematic as representation,
hierarchy or even inequality always exists in the most democracies. The interest
of the research consist rather in finding ways to point to the fact that as a matter
of participatory public dialogue the majority is systematically rendered unable to
participate in dialogic life. The description of this silent majority includes a
certain number of characters.
The silenced communities include for example the “Third World country
woman” (Spivak), the peasant, the “Vidomegon,” that is, the mistreated child
(Agossou, 2000), the illiterate city-dweller. While they make up the majority of
the poor and illiterate population, they constitute heterogeneous communities
crossed by inequality. That is, among silenced characters some are more silenced
than others and some can silence others while ultimately they are silenced by
those who control at least internally the power of enunciation in a culture which
is itself a culture of silence.
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The silencing of characters and communities explains the fact that
“movements or tendencies for popular change face crippling difficulties” (Good,
2002). The role of the African masses has been reduced to that of mute
accompaniments –‘paid extras’ at best – in the crowd scenes organized by the
kleptocrats. Their induced muteness has made it very difficult, almost
impossible, for any concept of citizenship to develop. The silencing results in the
‘weakness of the social formations’ on which the state rests. But this is
profoundly a two-way affair, an interrelationship in which the rulers play the
determinant role. Corrupt and autocratic elites have a deeply debilitating affect
on the mass of the people. Autocratic elites foster popular passivity, and
perpetuate themselves more comfortably upon it. Silence is the hand-maid of
elitism and ultimately the cloak of tyranny, even when an electoral politics exists.
The democratic experience of Benin has demonstrated that once the initial
excitement of the National Conference and the peaceful transition has weakened,
public opinion awakened to the reality that the new ruling elites of the
democratic context had the potential to be just as autocratic as their colonial and
dictatorial predecessors.
C. Silencer Characters
The silencer characters are the ones who have the power of knowledge,
position and resource to become “communicative silencers” of the “silenced
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communities,” the uneducated majority. In the colonial era, they were the
“évolués” (evolved, “Frenchized”) who demonstrated a remarkable success at
European-style education, which, in turn, became a passport to administrative
service in bureaucracies throughout the French-ruled West-Africa. For this
reason, the colonizers qualified Dahomey as “le Quartier Latin de l’Afrique”
(Latin Quarter of Africa) in reference to the famous “Quartier Latin” of Sorbonne,
a place of social meeting and academic stimulation for French intellectuals  (see
Campbell, 39 and notes).  From 1960 on, the “évolués” took over the control of
the Western-style administration of the newly and rather nominally independent
nation. Today, these educated still refer with pride to their nation as “Quartier
Latin de l’Afrique.” Local languages use the Yoruba word, “Akowe” (the one
who knows how to write the letter, the paper), to name them, indicating that
their character types have taken on such distinctive forms in the collective
consciousness even among those without Western-style education. It is possible
to distinguish a certain number of types including the military, the “diplomé
sans emploi,” the “functionnaire” and the intellectual elite.
First, the military is a character type of variable level of education enjoying a
high visibility due to the presence of military officers virtually everywhere in the
nation and because of their uniforms and other militarist rituals during training
sessions and official parades. More importantly, with stories of numerous coups
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d’état from the 1960 through 1972 and the 17-year long militarist regime of
General Matthieu Kérékou, the character of the military has played a major role
in the life of the nation, although the military has retracted from political
involvement since the democratic renewal of the 90’s. However, with a job
situation of 40% unemployment (PNUD, 2003) many young Beninese dream of a
military career because of the usually steady paycheck, if not for anything else.
By contrast, the character of “diplômé sans emploi” is without job and without
paycheck.
Second, the “diplômé sans emploi” is the graduate without work. Most
educated young people identify in spite of themselves to this character that
embodies very strongly how education and development fail to deliver on their
promise of a better life. Particularly, the character illustrates very sadly
everything that is wrong with the education system. Colonizers created the
French school to groom local office clerks for colonial needs. Today, the Beninese
school has basically become a machine producing the unemployed (Hountondji,
2000, 226). In these conditions, the character of the “diplômé sans employ” is not
a cultural ideal to which the youth aspires, but rather a social nightmare in which
end the dreams of those who represent the future of the nation. The character
spends years and resources to buy into the project of modernization without at
the end nothing to show for it but French language, modern clothing, manners
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and cell phone to compensate the lack of success with the illusion of being
branché. This appearance helps them save face and draws the admiration of their
illiterate relatives in the village, who sometimes say “diplômé sans emploi with a
note of irony. Another character is the “fonctionnaire.”
Contrary to the “diplômé sans emploi,” the “fonctionnaire,” the
government worker is a character type that bought into the Westernization
project and has a job and a salary to show for it. Typically, the occupation does
not usually imply productivity or creation of wealth. Many fonctionnaires may
well have the qualifications for their positions, but they get hired usually because
they have connections, while the “diplômé sans emploi” remains unemployed in
spite of their qualifications because of job scarcity and also because they have no
connections. With organized labor unions, the fonctionaires have proven to be
very powerful politically. When they go on strike, they can paralyze the
government as was the case in the national crisis leading to the National
Conference. The contrast between them and the characters of the “silenced
communities” is that the underprivileged has no such political power except
their votes, which are besides, routinely manipulated by politicians.
Although all the precedent educated are vaguely referred to as
intellectuals and Akowé, the interest of the research focuses on the elite among the
intellectual Akowé. The elite constitute the character the most consummate in the
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process of westernization, which usually includes advanced university degrees,
often from foreign academic institutions, with a variety of professional expertise.
These intellectual elites tend to occupy senior positions in public administration,
politics, civil society or in private practice of their profession. They are the ones
talking all the time on behalf of the people. While the other characters included
in the Western educated group are all “communicative silencers” at different
degrees the research focuses particularly on the elite among the “intellectuals”
who can afford the activity of research and academic conceptual formation. To
these elite among intellectual Akowé, the discussion now turns.
III. Akowé
The characters telling the story of Benin’s culture of silence represent a
continuum going from the poorest illiterate villager, the most silenced among the
silenced characters whose world has little modern influence to the Akowé elite,
those Western educated intellectuals who, albeit a seemingly perfect “white
mask,” remains physically and metaphorically “black skin” (Fanon) to some
extent. While the inequality of participation in the dialogic life of democracy
compromises the strength of democracy, the character of Akowé is the
communicative silencer per excellence with the most pronounced extraversion
and the strongest silencing power.
The Akowé’s political competence and social visibility is in contrast with
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the fact that they constitute a very small minority. They are only 1% of the
population according to Igué (1999). La crème de la crème among the educated,
these Akowé bear titles like “leaders,” “elites,” “intelligentsia” or “intellectuals”
as they belong to the “privilegenstia” in the word of a Sudanese novelist
(Nuruddin Farrah). They are an elite group of privileged dominating the
majority of the common people. They are teachers, professors, professionals,
military officers and lawyers. Since the beginning of the young democracy in
1990, they have founded 110 political parties ( ).  It is important to keep in mind
that the exclusive monopole of privileges finds explanation in the rent system
characteristic of the post-colonial conditions and the advantages made available
by literacy and modernization.
The Akowé control powers and privileges because of a combination of the
following three characteristics. (1) Knowledge: they are educated in Western
school with more or less advanced degrees. (2) Position: they are higher up in the
social ladder because of a professional career and/or political appointment
and/or a business venture. (3) Resources: they are well off without any evident
proof of personal production of wealth. For these reasons authors have blamed
African intellectuals for “the criminalization of the State” (Bayart et al. 1997), for
“la politique du ventre,”  that is, “politic of the belly” (Bayart) and for “political
instrumentalization of disorder” and chaos (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The
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professor Ayittey (1999) stigmatizes the incapacity of African intellectuals to use
their book knowledge to help solve the continent’s monumental problems while
they seem content incompetence kleptomania.
In sum, Benin has a small minority of intellectuals who control wealth,
knowledge and position. They dominate the economic, political and social
scenes. They control discourses and communicative actions of all types: political,
mass-media, civil society, organizational, development project, public
administration, even traditional power structure (there is a spreading
phenomenon of intellectuals becoming traditional chiefs). They are public
communicators who articulate undemocratically the “cultural truth” (White,
1995) and social meaning (Barbero, ) in a society whose political life is organized
around powerful, rival intellectuals and “big men” rather than social and
political theories. This is why they are communicative silencers.
IV. Communicative Silencer
The suggestion of the metaphor of communicative silencer indicates that
intellectual elite who control the articulation of social meaning creates silencing
as they go about what they see as their patriotic duty. Consequently those who
are believed to be silent because ignorant are framed as such not because they are
but because they are not listened to.
The interpretation  of the Akowe elite as a character type indicates that he is an
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embedded agent in a standpoint (Harding, year) or narrative (Arnett, year) of
Western education and privilege. Here lies a serious pitfall, which is the mistake
of condemning the intellectual elite while remaining oblivious of the ground on
which they stand, the story they share or the culture of silence they embody. The
revolutionaries of Kérékou’s socialist regime did not understand this distinction
when in the 1970’s, they stigmatized and ridiculed the Akowé elite as “intellectuals
tarés,” that is ignorant intellectuals. Soglo, the first democratic president and his
regime did not understand this distinction either when in the 1990’s they were
calling for a new leadership practices by a new kind of men (les hommes nouveaux)
without articulating clearly the necessity of change in the background story. The
distinction to keep in mind is this: it is not so much the Akowé elite as person as
much as it is the ground on which he stands, that is problematic.  To consider
and condemn the Akowé elite as a disembedded individual would be
counterproductive and would lead to the repetition of the same mistakes
consistent with the philosophical error made by the West and with which this
research is at least partly concerned.  Consequently, with its focus on the
intellectual elite, this research interprets in this culture or grand the call to
responsibility for these intellectual elites. I will place responsibility on the Akowe
as a group representing a character type, for intellectuals have embraced this
model of thinking, and a call to responsibility, to an eventual change in
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orientation, must be in a vocabulary the Akowe can hear.
A. Culture of Silence
A culture of silence is a culture unable to experience a genuine dialogue
internally within itself and externally with other cultures because it is incapable
“to assume the posture of one who ‘has a voice,’ of one who is the subject of his
choices, of one who freely projects his own destiny” (Freire, 2000, 11). This
incapacity is not “ontological” because such a thing does not exist, writes Freire.
It is due to the existing conditions of domination. This condition of domination
evolves in a twofold pattern.
On the one hand, the culturally alienated society as a whole is dependent on the
society that oppresses it and whose economic and cultural interest it serves. At
the same time, within the alienated society itself, a regime of oppression is
imposed upon the masses by the power elites that in certain cases are the same as
the external elites and in others are the external elites transformed by a kind of
metastasis into domestic power groups. Freire, 2000, 9
The culture of the alienated society is a culture of silence externally and internal.
Externally, the “metropolis society” prescribes its word, thereby effectively
silencing the alienated society that is not worth of being heard. “Meanwhile
within the alienated society itself, the masses are subjected to the same kind of
silence by the power elites” (Freire, 2000, 9).
The concept of culture of silence accounts for both the exogenous and the
endogenous factors of domination and silencing. Describing this phenomenon as
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a culture as Freire does is particularly insightful. As such, France, the main
metropolis society of the alienated society of Benin does not really need anymore
to be actively meddling into the national affaires of its former colony. The
citizens, the institutions and the social practices in Benin have been so deeply
socialized into the domination that they have internalized and naturalized this
culture. This culture is the result of “the structural relations between dominated
and dominators” (44) – internally and externally.
The concept becomes a key interpretive tool for this research because of
the description of the silencing phenomenon marking this culture a phenomenon
internalized to the point of becoming naturalized. Freire explains that
“understanding the culture of silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as
a relational phenomenon that gives rise to different forms of being, of thinking,
of expressions, those of the culture of silence, and those of the culture that ‘has a
voice’” (44). The culture of silence situates the communicative silencer in a
structural greater whole and local context, in the global and the national where in
the different forms of being, thinking and speaking, the elite Akowé is
communicatively silenced by the metropolis and while he carries over the dirty
work he becomes the local silencer of the alienated mass. It is important to point
out that the most silenced citizens in the silenced society is able to turn at least
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occasionally into silencer of somebody else. However the epitome of the silenced
that turns into a silencer is the elite Akowé as communicative silencer.
The elite Akowé is the character in the society that controls the power of
position, knowledge or education and resources. As communicative silencer he is
the linchpin and the hinge of this relational and structural phenomenon of
silencing that is as local as it is global. In the communicative praxis of the
communicative silencer resides the paradigmatic case of understanding this
silencing in being, in thinking and in speaking that makes it impossible for the
silenced society and its citizens “to assume a posture of one who ‘has a voice,’ of
one who is the subject of his choices, of one who freely projects his own destiny”
(11). The concept of communicative silencer is not stigmatizing the inevitability
of occasional acts of communicative silencing interpersonally and in public
dialogue due to the fact that human beings are not perfect and the ideal I-Thou
dialogue is not possible all the time. The suggestion of the concept of
communicative silencer is pointing to the systematic characteristic of silencing in
a culture of silence. To show this, the discussion now resorts to the description of
systematically distorted communication by Habermas and Deetz.
B. Systematically Distorted Communication
The Akowé elite is the prime actor responsible of a “systematically
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distorted communication” that compromise the strengthening of democracy
born in the public dialogue of a historic National Conference that opened a
breach of hope and change into the existing culture of silence.
Taking his cues primarily from Gadamer and Habermas’ ideas bout the
necessity of a normative ideal of participation in democratic conception of
communication, Stanley Deetz (1992, 1999) describes the practices and conditions
of domination that preclude dialogic production of meaning for participative
democracy. He develops the concept of “systematically distorted
communication” in the corporate context (1992) and in the context of
communities and societies (1999, 2002). Undoubtedly, asymmetry and hierarchy
are not by themselves problematic. They characterize some relations such as
parent-child and teacher-student relations. Yet, even here, arbitrariness and
abuse are unwarranted.  Different from those inevitable asymmetric relations,
“Systematically distorted communication” comes in many shades, but it is
mainly a communicative background problem.
On the surface, “systematically distorted communication“ is strategy,
manipulation, and instrumental uses of communication. That the Akowé elite
possess the knowledge of French language, Western culture, modern technique
and professional expertise does not make them systematic communicative
silencers right a way, but shapes their practices in distinctive ways. The
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philosophical framework that forms their expectations for communication and
participation orients the Akowé toward the social and political world in ways that
make participation by the majority difficult. Their communicative praxis
becomes systematically distorted and centered on “reproductive
communication” as preferred approach as opposed to “productive
communication.” For Deetz, “reproductive communication” is a communication
of pure transmission similar to the “banking system” (Freire). From the
perspective of participation in public dialogue developed by this research, the
communicative silencer is a “monologic participant.” Meanwhile “productive
communication” generates integrative activities and new meanings through
participative mutual understanding. The Akowé elite contribute to such
communication as “dialogic participants” among others in the terms of the
participatory public dialogue framed by this work.  The systematic characteristic
of the communicative silencer’s communicative praxis depends then on whether
the communicative background is reproductive or productive.
While full participation as normative ideal is un-fulfilled in most
communicative acts, it is an ethical background requirement for democratic
communication. “For to the extent that the external world or other person is
silenced by the success of placing one’s position in place of conflict with
alternatives, the capacity to engage in conceptual expansion and reach open
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consensus on the subject matter is limited.” In Deetz’s description,
“systematically distorted communication” produces a silencing of the external
world and of the other person, to the point that this distortion or silencing
becomes “invisible constraint” to communicative acts and is disguised as natural
and self-evident (1999). One good example is the process of disqualification.
In every democracy, these invisible background constraints render self-
evident and natural the disqualification of certain groups and the
marginalization of certain discourses leading to “the rendering of the other
unable to speak adequately, including processes of deskilling” (1999).
Disqualification is the “discursive process” that excludes individuals, groups and
subject matters skewing the development of mutual understanding (189).
“Socially produced notions of expertise, professional qualifications, and
specialization are central to disqualification. They further reproduce themselves
by proclaiming who has the capacity” to qualify them or to question them (189).
This one example indicates that “systematically distorted communication, then,
is an ongoing process within particular systems as they strategically (though
latently) work to reproduce, rather than produce, themselves” (187). In a young
democracy that has at its beginning invented itself through public dialogue
during the historic National Conference and needs to continue producing itself
dialogically, systematically distorted communication coming in its benign form
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of reproductive communication constitutes a fatal erosion to democratic living
together, even more so when it is invisible.
The most important contribution of communicative silencer that makes it
central to this research concerns its insight into a very specific kind of
domination. Contrary to a dictator or tyrant, the communicative silencer is
situated admittedly in democratic context. Meanwhile, dominant liberal
democratic theories and practices insufficiently dialogic are imported from the
North and uncritically imposed on the silenced majority resulting in
strengthening the culture of silence and in unveiling the character of
communicative silencer as an “elite against democracy” (Good).  Likewise, from
within the culture of silence, the sources of the silencing phenomenon are not
only exogenous and Western. And the communicative praxis of other characters
can be silencing as well.  However, the Akowé elite is the hinge of reproductive
communication and the linchpin of the communicative silencing. His privileged
situation makes the communicative silencer unavoidable in understanding and
dealing with the culture of silence. For this reason, his attachment to the North
gives the communicative silencer additional justification to share into the horizon
of the ego of the Western philosophy deconstructed by Levinas.
C. Communicative Silencer as "Egocentric Autonomous”
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The relation between the communicative silencer and the culture of
silence is that of a mutually constitutive influence between the social actor and
his cultural background. They reinforce each other through systematic distortion
of communication to the point that beyond the strictly communicative
dimension, the culture of silence becomes the soil of cultivation of a specific
subjectivity. While individualism exists in Beninese cultures before and beside
the Western silencing influence, the intellectual elite become communicative
silencers because they bought into the “effort to be” (Levinas) of Western
philosophy with an “egocentric autonomous” subjectivity. That is, a “self-
emancipating ego necessarily allergic to the other, precisely on the ground of its
effort to be, which manifests itself as relentless and unending struggle toward
self-establishment and self-development in self-responsibility" (Burggraeve, 2002,
50) (Reading from TI and DEHH).
In the horizon of the ego, "knowledge appears as power or more
specifically as power over one's fellow person.  The ego's passage from distinct,
separate individuals to a freedom obtained by means of the idea of others in
general means not only that ego understands them -no doubt in all innocence -but
also that it takes them in hand, controls them, possesses them, suspending their
freedom without actually depriving them of their real difference (DEHH) 59.
This serious implication of knowledge as power of totalization and destructive
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com-prehension of the other and of the world is even more destructive in the
culture of silence. It put the intellectual elite in the most awkward position in his
navigation between the external factors and local dynamisms of silencing as his
subjectivity of ego-centered autonomous pretends and is expected to bring the
light of enlightenment into the “darkness of Africa.” Meanwhile, what he brings
in fact is the fire of destruction, silent disruption with invisible traces –no doubt
in all innocence. It is crucial to bear in mind the capacity of destruction of the
Western “effort to be.” The following example of the Heidegger controversy
illustrates the risks hidden in Western philosophy. Heidegger embodies the
Western ego-centric autonomy with the most pervasive and allusive contagion.
Levinas discusses the case of Heideggers’s connection to Hitlerism. The
significance for this interpretation amounts to a warning that Hitler and more
insidious, Heidegger are not a chance event, an accident de route in “axiology of
being.” When talking about the "Heidegger controversy" as it has come to be
called people claim without proof that there was an explicit connection between
Heidegger's ontology and Hitlerian racism. According to Levinas, that may not
be the case. He goes on to offer a reading more nuanced and more poignant all
the same. For him, the "Heidegger case" manifests how the "diabolical" is
"malicious" and "intelligent' because "it infiltrates wherever it wishes" (CCH 83).
And this infiltration can find its way into a thinking without being noticed. "In
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this sense, the diabolic can take hold of a thinking without calling attention to its
contagion. Thus, while there is no explicit connection between Heidegger's
ontology and Hitlerian racism, one can not rule out the disturbing possibility of a
hidden, unwilled but no less real affinity between the two" (Burggraeve, 61).
Considering Heidegger's sympathy for the National Socialism expressed in 1933
while he was the Rector of the university of Freiburg and in 1936 in Rome;
considering his silence about the extermination camp in the 1966 interview with
Der Spiegel, published after his death, Levinas asks a terrifying question. "But to
remain calmly silent about the gas chambers and death camps, does this not
testify -all poor excuses aside -to a mindset completely closed to all sensitivity
and thus in agreement with the horrible? (CCH 83).
The point here was not to demonize the West or the North. It is however
an attempt to challenge the intellectual elite. Since it is from the West that they
bring theories and ideas that fascinate the culture of silence, it was crucial to
ponder about their awareness of the “malicious,” the “diabolic” that infect
subjectivities in the culture of silence not as a chance event, but as a constitutive
part of everything good that the West has to offer. The next section illustrates
how the malicious infect the National Conference without calling attention to its
contagion.
V. Interpretation of the Conference
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In the trajectory of their development, cultures of civilizations reveal their
genius through a set of achievements through which they participate in their
distinctiveness in the human race. The Greek among other things, have given
democracy to the humanity and the Romans have perfected the codification of
laws. According to Eboussi Boulaga (1993), Benin has given the human a model
of political peaceful transition with its National Conference. The historic
significance of this public dialogue is not contestable. Yet, the malicious
contagion of the Western forces of silencing have insidiously compromise the
effort of the Conference to break the culture of silence, making the Conference a
mixt blessing. The interpretation discusses first the imagery of the whole report
and then focuses on three different kinds of metaphors or central concepts.
A. The Imagery of the Report
During the official closing ceremony on February 28, 1990, the Professor
Albert Tevoedjre, the spokesperson delivered to the participants of the
Conference and to the whole nation following live on radio and television, a
summary report acclaimed for its rhetorical power. The report functions
rhetorically to offer the nation’s standpoint and clarity of vision, at least to those
who speak French and to the diplomatic representations that the discourse
addressed in English and in German. The following excerpt is an evocative
summary of the nation’s consciousness of its journey through history not only
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after 17 years of oppression, but all together after 30 years of independence from
France.
“You have said and I remind you,” declared the spokesperson, indicating
his attempt to interpret faithfully the discussions, intentions and emotions of the
Public Dialogue. His interpretation of the public dialogue provides the evidence
that the nation through the participants had some awareness of the silencing of
the other and of the subject matter. He speaks the voice of a silenced society
when he says:
‘Money is our master no more.’ In fact, turning the back to our history and
geography, to our arts and skill we refuse to grow from our being and our
resources. Preferring the immediate gain of a few to the long term of everyone, we
chose to broaden momentarily the small circle of the privileged and we continue to
stifle the energy of the majority. Turned into our master, money dictated to us all
sorts of extravagance, wickedness and excess. Because we want money by all
means, we put ourselves in the danger of sacrificing our authentic culture, our
freedom, our sense of respect and our family values.
In the case of Benin, the silencing that Freire describes as silencing in the being,
the thinking and the speaking comes in terms of silencing of “our” history,
geography, arts, skills and resources. That the long term common good is
sacrificed for the immediate gain of a few is a form of silencing as well. And the
report continues:
Verres and Cartilina loomed up from everywhere and we were lacking in Cicero
who would denounce the scandals accumulating. Nero established himself with
ever more arrogance, which meant the hour of martyrdom has come…We became
assassins of our own values. Once Abel disappeared, we could no longer sleep.
150
The eye lit up in the night of our shame and let us to the National Conference of
the Living Forces of the de la Nation.
The beauty of the imagery reveals and conceals by the same breath. It reveals a
clear understanding of the role of the intellectual elites who are the Beninese
Cain, Nero, Verres and Catilina. However the imagery conceals the effect of
silencing as the images used do not speak to the majority of the people.
B. Abel
The official report invokes Abel to characterize the victims in Benin. There
are three dimensions to Abel: the powerless, “our own values” and our “we.”
First, the victims are all the powerless “martyrs” that the Beninese Neros and
Cains have exploited, sent into exile, imprisoned, tortured and murdered. “We
continue to stifle the energy of the majority.” Along with this silenced and
martyred majority, Abel is secondly the personification of “our authentic culture,
our freedom, our sense of respect and our family values” that we have sacrificed.
More inclusively and more insightfully, the third dimension of Abel is the ‘we’ as
in “we refuse to grow from our being and our resources.” The assassinations and
the stifling of the energy of the majority turn out to be the martyrdom of the
national collective being. For sure, during the extremely intense debates of the
Conference the ‘we’ functions as a rhetorical device to coop with the
understandable risk of excessive finger pointing that would have jeopardized the
hope for peaceful reforms, given the fact that no matter how weak, the
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oppressive regime was still in power during the Conference. More than a
rhetorical tactic, the martyred Abel as we is reminiscent of Buber’s “between” and
“essential We-ness,” the interhuman locus of communal responsibility that
makes the Conference a public dialogue for reconciliation, not a trial for the
condemnation of Verres, Catilina, Nero and Cain.
C. Verres, Catilina, Nero and Cain
Verres, Catilina, Nero and Cain are personifications of the “small circle of
the privileged,” who are “arrogant” and “assassins.” They are Beninese versions
of infamous figures in Roman and Biblical stories. Caius Verres was a late
Antiquity Roman of noble birth, but notorious for his crimes and exactions in the
civil war and in the offices he held. Lucius Catilina was an equally dubious
Roman politician infamous for his conspiracy to attack and destroy Rome by the
use of force. Remembered in history as a cruel Roman emperor, Nero ascended
to and fell from the imperial throne in the midst of criminal intrigues, only to die
in disgrace (Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities). Before Verres, Catilina
and Nero, Cain in fourth chapter of the book of Genesis has personified
fratricidal jealousy in human consciousness. The Conference and its report
invoke these figures to name metaphorically the dignitaries of the dying socialist
regime and other accomplices who have perpetrated all sorts of fratricidal and
public crimes. The Akowé elite occupy a preeminent position among them.
152
D. Cicero
While “Verres and Cartilina loomed up from everywhere we were lacking
in Cicero who would denounce the scandals accumulating,” says the report.
Historically, Cicero was the leading prosecutor against both Verres and Cartilina.
Here, Cicero is the figure of those Akowé elite who belong to the small circle of
privileged, and yet use their professional skills and their position as public
officials to denounce scandals and correct wrongs. Such figures were lacking
before the Conference and are still lacking. The Conference is doing Cicero-like
work with the notable difference that it is less a trial than it is a public dialogue.
As a public dialogue, the Conference is a placing of the victims of violence
and the perpetrators of violence in a dialogic relation, which removes the focus
of attention and care from either to place it on the between that is
communicatively emerging. However, for all its success, the Conference remains
caught up in a logic of a culture of silence. While a Cicero-like Albert Tevoedjre
reminds the nation that we “have turned our back to our values,” he invokes
foreign historical figures like Verres, Catilina and Nero with whom the illiterate
majority and even some literate cannot identify. This results in a sad irony: while
Cicero-like intellectuals denounce the Verres and Catilina and defend Abel, their
systematically distorted communication makes them communicative silencers
who disqualify Abel from democratic participation.
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E. The eye of conscience
The eye of conscience is the central metaphor that makes the Conference
looks less like a trial for condemnation and punishment and more like a public
dialogue for reconciliation and for “democratic renewal.” The eye of conscience
is the guilt from which Benin’s Cains and by extension Verres, Catilinas and
Neros cannot run away. The report quotes extensively the Victor Hugo rendition
of the biblical story entitled “Conscience.”
Cain, sleeping not, dreamed at the mountain foot.
Raising his head, in that funereal heaven
He saw an Eye –a great Eye, in the night,
Open, and staring at him in the gloom.
… As he went down alone into the vault;
But when he sat, so ghost-like, in his chair,
And thy had closed the dungeon o’er his head,
The Eye was in the tom, and fixed on Cain.
(see full text in appendix)
The “eye of the conscience” becomes the source hidden in the individual and public
consciousness from which springs, hesitant and fragile, the signs of guilt, shame,
hope and reconciliation: “Once Abel disappeared, we could no longer sleep. The
eye lit up in the night of our shame and led us to the National Conference.” [ ] As
politically unrealistic or irrelevant as the “eye of conscience” may appear, its
importance became clear in the night of February 21, 1990 when the dictator
Kérékou himself, probably not without some political calculations, pronounced a
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now historic confession in front of Conference: “We have come here to make our
confession…We must not betray Africa. If this conference fails, Benin will fall into
chaos…If the option for Marxism-Leninism has divided the children of this
nation, is it a crime to challenge it? …I am ashamed of myself” (emphasis added –
Adamon, 1995, 56).
One relevant question to ponder is that if the confession is not just a pure
political calculation, then why only now? Why feel guilty now? The answer lies
in the fact a historical moment has occurred, which is that which is dialogically
emerging from within and puts a conscience into question with the authority of
powerlessness. The “eye of conscience” is reminiscent of Levinas’ (A & T 105)
phenomenological description of the face, “that possibility of murder, that
powerlessness of being and that authority that commands me: “Thou shall not
kill.” Levinas’ face or the National Conference’s “eye of conscience” is “all
weakness and all authority.” The between  is a site of the interhuman previously
described but it now appears as well that it includes the tumb and all hiding
places where the eye of the conscience relentlessly follows all the guilty





Conversion to the people requires a profound rebirth. Those who undergo it must take on
a new form of existence; they can no longer remain as they were.   
Paulo Freire, 1970, 2002, 61.
Dialogue not only means awareness of what addresses one, but responsibility.
Responsibility, for Buber, means responding -hearing the unreduced claim of each
particular hour in all its crudeness and disharmony and answering it out of the depths
of one's being.
Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber and the Eternal.
We are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than others.
Dostoyevsky
The significance of this interpretive endeavor consists in unveiling the
communicative participation of the intellectual in the dialogic life of Benin as a
communicative silencer. Additionally, this chapter begins to flesh out a
suggested  communicative alternative for the communicative silencer with the
metaphor of responsive listener.  The chapter articulates first the
phenomenological change of orientation from the autonomous ego-centered
position of the communicative silencer to an ethical position of a responsive “I.”
The following sections work to articulate the communicative implication of such
change of orientation with the metaphor of communicative listener. Finally, the
third section articulates the metaphor of responsive listener.
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 I. From Communicative Silencer to Responsive I
The articulation of a different kind of communicative praxis for the
communicative silencer requires an entire change of orientation, understood here
as a phenomenological focus of attention. The shift includes first a new
appreciation of the hermeneutic situation by a historically effected consciousness
and second, a new orientation toward responsibility.
A. Hermeneutic Situation and Consciousness
In his essay on the National Conference, Eboussi Boulaga (1993) discusses
the “hermeneutic situation” of those members of the silenced society who are
without autonomy, the ones this research calls the “silenced communities.”
According to Eboussi Boulaga, the silenced ones “are characterized not according
to what they possess, not according to who they are, but rather according to what
they lack, and what someone else makes of them, according to their dependence
on someone else” (22). This hermeneutic situation of the silenced ones deprived
of a position of enunciation echoes Spivak’s deconstructive question discussed in
chapter one in an attempt to illustrate the irony of non-participatory élan in
researches and projects of participatory development, participatory democracy
and participatory communication. “Can the subaltern speak?” asks Spivak
provocatively. In terms of its contribution to the debate over participation
projects constantly turning non-participatory, this research, centered on
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participation into public dialogue, refuses to speak on behalf of the subaltern, the
“Third World Woman,” the silenced. The research refuses to add one more
volume to the long list of works that study if and how the silenced, Spivak’s
subaltern, speaks and participates.
The research interprets otherwise the scholarship of participatory
communication informed by a Buber-inspired conception of public dialogue and
operates two related shifts in focus. On the one hand, the phenomenological
focus of attention shifts away from the silenced to the silencer. On the other
hand, the focus moves beyond speaking to center on listening. In stead of asking
“can the silenced speak?” the interpretation asks “can the communicative
silencer listen?” As the interpretation places the question of inquiry on the
communicative silencer, it embraces the assumption coming from the dialogic
framework. The research assumes that no matter how poor, illiterate,
underprivileged, or voiceless he is, the silenced speaks at the very minimum by
his or her very existence.  The dialogic framework affords such assumption
because dialogue is as much about listening as it is about speaking. In this
historical moment of excessive and exclusive focus on the “freedom of speech”
(Deetz, Grim & Lyon, 2003, 58) and on the expressive dimension of language
(Fiumara, 2002), the research pays heed interpretively to the responsibility of
listening and welcomes the unsettling consequence of navigating with a
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“nocturnal map” (Barbero, 1993) in uncharted waters,. In its difficult task of
framing dialogically with and for the communicative silencer a communication
focused primarily on responsibility and on listening, the research works with
pioneers such as Buber, Levinas and Freire to glean clues and insights into
interpreting the historical moment of the National Conference and the lived
experience of the Akowé elites.
The historical moment and the lived experience of the Akowé elite shape
his hermeneutic situation.  While their hermeneutic situation deprives the
silenced ones of their capacity for enunciation, the hermeneutic situation of the
communicative silencer assures for him a hegemonic control over enunciation.
Logically, the communicative silencer frames the silenced and his enunciation or
participation, while simultaneously solidifying the culture of silence. This
explains the communicative praxis of the communicative silencer. That is, the
character of the intellectual elite is a communicative silencer when his
“hermeneutical consciousness” (Gadamer, 1998) reduces the hermeneutic
situation to a “methodological sureness of itself.” In that case, the metaphor of
the communicative silencer framed by this research is reminiscent of Gadamer’s
depicture of the “man captivated by dogma” (362).
The intellectual elites are not the only human beings or Beninese citizens
capable of domination and silencing. Besides the truism that inequality and
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injustice are universal and perennial problems, the illiterate and the poor are
capable of and do silence and oppress each other to be consistent with the
discussion of the culture of silence (Freire, 2000). The difference in the case of the
intellectual elite, though, resides in the intellectuals’ captivity to the dogmas of
modernization, westernization, liberal democratization, and associated
phenomena. This captivity of theirs explains their position of linchpin in the
culture of silence and their role of hinge between the external and internal
dimensions of this culture of silence.
In opposition to the “man captivated by dogma,” Gadamer points to the
“experienced man.” In contrast to the hermeneutical consciousness of the former
marked by methodological sureness of this consciousness, Gadamer describes for
the latter a “historically effected consciousness” marked by “openness” and
readiness for experience. The “orientation toward openness” (370) of the
“historically effected consciousness” deepens the understanding of a
hermeneutic situation where the interpreter does not control the silenced ones
neither dominates the historical text with the “methodological sureness” of his
research question. The hermeneutical consciousness that is historically effected
welcomes the other and the historical text that “put a question to the interpreter”
(369). Such was the case at the National Conference.
160
In spite of its flaws, namely the monopoly by the intellectuals, the
historical moment of the public dialogue and the “face” of decades of suffering
and oppression “put a question to the interpreter.” Historicity effected the
consciousness of the communicative silencer to hear “the unreduced claim” of
that hour, of that historical moment “in all its crudeness and disharmony and
answering it out of the depths of one’s being” (Friedman). In such historical
moments dialogue reveals itself as “awareness of what addresses one” and the
responsibility to that address. Friedman adds that this responsibility for Buber
means responding.
Among the philosophers who develop such sense of responsibility,
Levinas stands out. The unfolding interpretation of the Akowé (intellectual) elite’s
communicative praxis  relies on his philosophy to articulate the call to
responsibility emerging from the hermeneutic situation when the hermeneutical
consciousness of the communicative silencer is effected by historicity for an
“orientation toward openness,” that is, the liberation from the captivity of
dogmas for the openness to experience (Gadamer).
B. Communicative Silencer and Orientation toward Responsibility
The argument of this research concerns the communicative praxis of
intellectual elites unveiled by this research as the communicative silencer
working as the linchpin in a culture of silence where the poor and the illiterate
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are communicatively silenced. However, in spite of a culture and a horizon of
experience marked by captivity and silencing, the historical moment of a public
dialogue during the National Conference carries for all and particularly for the
communicative silencers a call for an “orientation toward openness.” This call is
not just an intellectual issue or a communicative reality. It reaches the depths of
one’s being (Friedman). When the Akowé elite hears history, he cannot be the
same. The familiarityof his captivity to dogma and  methodological sureness lose
their comfort when history enters them and when the face of the other emerges.
1. Responsibility-for-the-Other
The crucial task of this research as a whole is not only to define
conceptually responsibility in the abstract, but to engage dialogically the Akowé
elite in a way that they pay heed to the call of responsibility. This interpretation
of the Levinasian philosophy of responsibility keys in on an understanding of
responsibility before and beyond interest, justice, and guilt.
In his 1982 conversation with Philippe Nemo, Levinas states: “I
understand responsibility as responsibility for the Other, thus responsibility for
what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or which precisely
does not matter to me, is met by me as face” (Levinas, 1998, 95). Responsibility
situates the intellectual elite, the communicative silencer in the site of “what does
not even matter to me” and yet “is met by me as face.” Levinas realistically
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acknowledges that “usually, one is responsible for what one does oneself” (96),
for one’s deeds, one’s interests. Such is the conception of responsibility by the
Akowé elite who are only concerned with their interests, their pockets or “their
part of the cake,” according to the popular expression. Given the fact they control
the articulation of social meaning, the framing of public issues and the making of
policies, their part is always the lion’s share. Democratic constitution and
regulations or institutional arrangements do not lead to a different sense of
responsibility. In a culture of silence with all-powerful communicative silencers,
the democratic living together requires Levinas’s articulation of responsibility
situated beyond “what matters to me.”
This Levinasian perspective also situates responsibility before justice. “I
am responsible in principle, and I am so before the justice that distributes, before
the measures of justice” (Levinas, 1999, 106). This is deliberately excessive et
pour cause! For all justification for such excess, Levinas adds, “It is concrete, you
know! It is not made up! When you have encountered a human being you cannot
drop him” (106). The other so strongly calls the I into responsibility such that
even if there are possible considerations of justice or injustice from the point of
view of the I, the other is still “met by me as face” (Levinas, 1998, 95), without
deliberation. “A responsibility prior to deliberation, to which I was exposed,
dedicated, before being dedicated to myself” (Levinas, 1999, 105).
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Responsibility before self-interest and before justice is additionally
responsibility beyond guilt. It is the responsibility of one who is not guilty, who
is innocent, but who paradoxically can never say “I have done all I could!” (106).
The paradox of the innocent called to responsibility is completely apparent when
Levinas quotes Dostoyevsky: “We are all guilty of all and for all men before all,
and I more than the others” (1998, 98, 101). That is, the call to responsibility is a
placing of guilt on the innocent. At this point, it is important to situate the call to
responsibility with the face and then to explicit the posture of the I.
First, responsibility before and beyond self-interest, justice and guilt
comes from the face. The face, “that impossibility of murder, that powerlessness
of being and that authority that command me: ’Thou shalt not kill.’” Levinas
explains that what distinguishes the face in its status from all known objects
comes from its contradictory nature. “It is all weakness and all authority”
(Levinas, 1999, 104-105). Responsibility-for-the-Other is the face in its authority
of weakness and powerlessness saying ”Thou shalt not kill.” The description of
the face of the other from which originates responsibility posits the I as a being in
responsibility-for-the-other. The I is in an ethical position of posture for the other.
Responsibility-for-the-Other is the I, “I, more than others” responding, “’Here I
am,’ or ‘Send me’ toward the other” (105).
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The excessive character of this radical articulation of responsibility is all
too obvious. With Levinas, the research enters deliberately into a radical
interpretation of responsibility with what the philosopher himself describes as
“extreme formulation” (1998, 97). The significance of Levinas’s philosophy of
responsibility for this research concerns the possibility of interpreting the
responsibility of the I, not as an ego-centric I, but the I-for-the-other, the
disinterested I that “feels” the responsibility of “I, more than the others” to
become “my brother’s keeper.” This sense of responsibility-for-the-Other comes
with the potential of producing tremor and reverence in the I, in the
communicative silencer. Along with the I-for-the-other, the interpretation affords
the possibility of accounting for the authority coming from powerlessness, the
authority of weakness in the culture of silence. That is, the silenced “Third World
Woman,” or the silenced child kept into slave work and commonly known in
Benin as “Vidomegon” still has a face. No matter how disfigured,  desperate and
emaciated is this face, the weakness and the powerlessness of the concrete face
still have a peculiar kind of authority crying out “Thou shall not kill” and
summoning the communicative silencer into responsibility.
The National Conference has heard this authoritative voice of weakness
and powerlessness. On behalf of all the participants to the Conference and by
extension all the Beninese citizens, Tévoédjrè poetically recalls in his general
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report for this Conference that once Abel was murdered, the eye of the
conscience opened and led the nation to the National Conference. He echoes
thus, in a very Levinasian tone, the emergence of a theme that most writings and
discourses on political transition, democratization, development, or social
change fail to account for. The scholarship of the National Conference (Banégas,
2003; Noudjenoume, 1999) provides the clearest example of this oblivion as it
usually silences themes such as the eye of conscience echoing Levinas’s
responsibility-for-the-other. If the National Conference has succeeded in
breaking through the culture of silence in order to provide to the culture a shot at
speaking itself through public dialogue, the ensuing interpretation and
development of Conference have been lured back into the silencing still
prevalent. “Thus, the specific particularity of the African situation is regulated to
oblivion” (Serequeberhan, 1994, 34; see also Barbero, 1993). The Akowé elite has a
crucial role to play in this situation and this research presents him or her with an
interpretation of the hermeneutic situation in which the temptation of
communicative silencing and the call for the election of the responsive I are
intertwined as weed and flower.
2. Election of the Responsive I
According to Burggraeve (2002, 101), the responsibility-through-and-for-
the-Other immediately invokes the idea of “election”. “The putting into question
166
of the ego by the Other is ipso facto an election, an ordering to a privileged place
on which everything depends but which is not al all an ego”. The idea of election
is like an awakening to the Other and in many ways mimics the logic of sense-
bestowal described in Totality and Infinity (Drabinski, 2001, 185). It is this
privileged place of election and sense-bestowal on which everything depends,
which is usually difficult to account for. At the National Conference of Benin, the
historical moment of the public dialogue, this privileged place has emerged.
The I put into question by the Other in a form of election or sense-
bestowal  “is not at all an ego.” According to Arnett (2004), it is a “responsive I.”
Levinas and Buber frame an insightful sense of “I” shaped in response, not in
agency. “Neither rejects the notion of I; each attends to a responsive construction
that moves from individualism to responsible attentiveness to the Other and the
historical situation” (Arnett, 2004, 76).  The responsive I emerges from the
election before and beyond self-interest, self-actualization, justice, innocence and
deliberation. The historical situation of the National Conference and the ensuing
democratic renewal “elect” the communicative silencer as “responsive I” called
to responsive attentiveness to the Other. This election emerging from the
historical situation frames otherwise the subjectivity of the responsive I.
Levinas describes an alienable identity of subject. “I am I in the sole
measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself
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for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me” (Levinas, 1998, 101). With
Levinas, this research embraces this radical understanding of the subjectivity of
the responsive I. There is here a peculiar orientation and focus in welcoming the
election. When Levinas goes as far as saying, “I am responsible for the
persecutions that I undergo,” he adds, “but only me! My ‘close relations’ or ‘my
people’ are already the others and, for them, I demand justice” (99). It is strictly
for the I that the election from the historical moment emerges. Levinas explains
that his “extreme formulas” must not be taken out of their context.
II. From Responsive I to Communicative Listener
The preceding discussion of the responsibility-for-the-other from which
emerges the subjectivity of a non ego-centered “responsive I” constituted by
attentiveness and responsibility to the other and the historical moment creates an
ethical condition and orientation for a communicative praxis centered on
listening rather than on silencing. Then again, as hermeneutic situation and
hermeneutical consciousness have been interpreted otherwise, as responsibility
has been interpreted otherwise, the concept of listening calls for an interpretation
otherwise.
The kind of listening required in the communicative development of the
responsibility-for-the-other is articulated against the backdrop of the kind of
listening that belongs to the culture of silence and can only reinforce the
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communicative praxis of communicative silencers. These listening theories
reflect “the tendency of communication studies to follow the lead of cognitive
psychology in viewing communication (and listening) as a product of a thinking
individual” (Purdy, 2000, 47). This understanding of listening concerns itself with
listening effectiveness and distinguishes measurable stages of listening behavior
including, in the case of HURIER behavioral model, elements such as hearing,
understanding, remembering, interpreting, evaluating, and responding
(Brownell, 1996, 35). This research takes note of the phenomenological
descriptive turn in listening study (Purdy, 2000) and relies on the Fiumara’s
(2002) whose philosophy interprets listening as “The Other Side of Language,” as
opposed to the “logocratic” and expressive understanding of language.
Fiumara’s “philosophy of listening” is developed against the backdrop of
“a culture that in some respects has by now rendered itself torpid, can generate a
vast ‘philosophical’ production concerning expression and, comparatively, very
little work on the process of authentic listening” (177). Fiumara makes the case
that this paucity of listening constitutes a very profound lack in the Western
philosophy and culture:
We could, in fact, construe that the absence of a philosophical analysis of
listening is not a culpability of any particular orientation, since the
phenomenon might be considered as the peak of a desperate and silent
need, an interrogative that is too disquieting for western culture as a
whole. In the dizzy affirmation of our logos there is hardly any ‘logical’
space left for the ‘hidden’ but essential tradition of listening. It is, in any
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case, un-thinkable that listening be revealed as philosophical dimension,
since it is, by now, too alien to the tradition based on expressive language.
(Fiumara, 2002 29)
This desperate and silent lack of listening in the Western philosophy, culture and
language produces a “non-listening perspective” of a “logocentric” and
“logocratic” rationality that “surreptitiously absorbs all knowledge claims with
the ultimate result of silencing any ‘illogical’ voice that might be heard.” She
adds that this silencing is prone to conflagration or “raging fires” of pride (45).
The communicative silencer has much to gain in matter of critical awareness by
pondering this Western “form of logocentric terrorism” (45).
As a hinge between external Western and now global sources and the
local causes of the relational structure described as culture of silence, an
irreplaceable responsibility lies on the communicative silencer. His participation
in the democratic living together requires of him an ethical decision between
remaining silenced and captive of the Western dogmas and “logocentric
terrorism” or to become the Responsive I for the silenced ones and for the
silenced culture. Because the causes of the culture of silence are numerous and
shared, the solutions toward a culture of dialogue are multiple and require of all
citizens to become dialogic participants. However, the focus of this research on
the Akowé elite as communicative silencer reveals for him an irreplaceable
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responsibility-for-the-other silenced, which communicatively means a
responsibility to listen.
The responsibility emerging from the silenced face crying out with his
authority of weakness and of powerlessness, the communicative confirmation
happens in understanding the productive power of listening. “In our concern for
listening a demand for change is made upon us – indeed, almost a demand for
mutation. Unless we are prepared to become in some way different from what
we are, listening cannot be understood properly” (165). If the demand for change
should be placed on anyone, it is on the intellectual elite. More precisely it is on
“I, more than the others.” In this necessity lies the possibility of change, the
possibility of creating a culture that can say its own work, a culture of listening.
“If we cannot listen properly, it seems that we can no longer share in “creative
thinking,” and that we must confine ourselves more and more to circulating
within a given repertory, or arsenal, of terms and standard articulations, which
can be summoned up each time in mnemonic fashion; almost a pledge to comply
with standard ways of mirroring and with reproductive thinking. The inhibition
of growth begins to make itself felt, however unhalting the progress of knowledge,
when thought rigidifies into the imitative reflection of current epistemological
metastructures.” 167
The listening needed is one that “serves to enhance the creation of language and
the growth of the speaking person, thus freeing humans in the making from the
forced role of users and imitators of whatever language happens to be most
effectively propagated in the market.” (167). While everyone is silenced to
different degrees in the culture of silence, the intellectual elite is the speaking
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person par excellence that is called by the historical moment to help move the
culture of silence to a cultivation of listening. “Listening can be a support to the
hermeneutic effort whereby we seek to establish a relationship between our
world and a different ‘world,’ between our own attitude and a different attitude
which seems to be pursuing ‘unthinkable’ aims and using untranslatable
language. No formative discourse can be ‘normal’ in the sense that only the force
of something which is ‘alien’ to us, and to which we choose to expose ourselves
receptively can draw us out of a restrictive paradigm” (168). 
III. Toward the Metaphor of Responsive Listener
The responsive listener is the intellectual elite who has come to discover that
the tendency for elite to control the sovereignty of the people in every democracy
–ancient and modern – is even more pronounced in a culture of silence where the
strengthening of democratization depends heavily on the kind of communicative
praxis his participation brings into the dialogic life of the society. The first step
toward becoming responsive listener is the critical awareness of the Akowé elite
about his role of communicative silencer that comes with a continual
attentiveness to the systematically distorted communication silencing the other
and the common world.  The responsive listener welcomes the call to
responsibility for listening to the silenced members in order to strengthen the
dialogic life of a society breaking gradually the culture of silence through a
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dialogic cultivation of listening. The responsive listener is the intellectual democrat
elite who hears the call to the responsibility of listening from the authority of
powerless and weakness coming from the face of the silenced other and the
historical moment. The responsive listener “feels” the responsibility of listening as
a responsive I that says “I more than the others.” It is a move away from an
"individual" embedded in a Western, transmission model or narrative of
participation to a responsive listener embedded in a Levinasian ethical narrative
of responsibility for the Other.
A. Responsive Listener: a Way of Thinking
The communicative praxis of the responsive listener engages a way of
thinking different from thinking in the culture of silence, that is, what Freire calls
“thinking correctly”. “Thinking correctly is, in other words, not an isolated act or
something to draw near in isolation but an act of communication. For this reason,
there is no right thinking without understanding, and this understanding, from a
correct thinking point of view, is not something transferred but something that
belongs essentially to the process of coparticipation. If, from a grammatical point
of view, the verb to understand is “transitive,” in relation to a correct way of
thinking it is also a verb whose subject is always a coparticipant with the other.”
All understanding, if it is not mechanistically treated, that is, submitted to the
alienating care that threatens the mind and that I have been designating as a
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“bureaucratized” mind, necessarily implies communicability. There is no
knowing (that is, connecting one thing to another) something that is not at the
same time a “communication” of the something known (unless, of course, the
process of knowing has broken down). The act of a correct way of thinking does
not “transfer,” “deposit,” “offer,” or “donate” to the other as if the receiver were
passive object of facts, concepts, and intelligibility.
To be coherent, the educator who thinks correctly, exercising as a human
subject the incontestable practice of comprehension, challenges the learner with
whom and to whom. Thinking and Schrag’s by, for and about.
B. Responsive Listener: a Way of Speaking
The metaphor of responsive listener, because it aims to give priority to
listening over telling in the communicative praxis of the Akowé elite, tends to give
the impression that the intellectual elite has no right or responsibility to speak.
To the contrary, the metaphor is suggested to the communicative silencer who
already controls the articulation of social meaning. As Mouffe (2000, 15) has put
it, “no amount of dialogue or moral preaching will ever convince the ruling class
to give up its power.” The aim of this research in to convince the intellectual elite
to give up their power to articulation of social meaning in the Beninese culture of
silence.  The metaphors of responsive listener only attempt to invest the speaking
of the intellectual elite with responsibility and listening for the strengthening of
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the young democracy through a continued search for a broader and meaningful
participation
Freire (1997) helps understand the significance of a speaking invested by
listening. “If we don’t learn how to listen […]in truth we don’t really learn how
to speak. Only those who listen, speak. Those who do not listen, end up merely
yelling, barking out the language while imposing their ideas. The one who is a
student of listening implies a certain treatment of silence and the intermediary
moments of silence” (306). He goes further to explain that those who speak
democratically need to silence themselves so that the voice of those who must be
listened to is allowed to emerge. “I lived the experience of the speech of those
who listened and I perceived that educational work that must follow required
creativity as well as humility. It is also a kind of work that implies taking risks
that those who have been silenced cannot take” (306).
Likewise, the responsive listener is the intellectual elite who has become
aware of his communicative responsibility in the culture of silence and who
attempts to take upon himself the risk to speak with creativity, “a risk that those
who have been silenced cannot take” (Freire, 1997, 306). The responsive listener
understands that as the institutional arrangements in the place in the culture of
silence usually give him the opportunity to speak for or on behalf of those who
have been silence, he also have the responsibility to speak with them in order to
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help the culture of silence become a dialogic society that speak its way into a
better future.
“Little Goodness” or Limits of the Metaphor of Responsive listener
 The limits of responsive listener as a suggested alternative to
communicative silencer come with the fact that the metaphor is a question of
responsibility. The National Conference has proved that in the nation of Benin
the authoritative call coming from weakness and powerlessness has received an
answer, according to the report that claims that the eye of the conscience has
raised from the tomb and led “us to the National Conference” (Tevoedjre, 1994).
That such phenomenon is powerful enough to become the near mythical origin
of the nation’s democracy should not let us to forget that it is comparable to the
phenomena that Levinas calls “little goodness” (1999). He defines “little
goodness” with a quote worth citing from Ikonikov:
Thus there is exists side by side with this so terrible greater good human kindness
in everyday life. It is the kindness of an old lady who gives a piece of bread to a
convict along the roadside. It is the kindness of a soldier who holds his canteen out
to a wounded enemy. The kindness of youth taking pity of an old age, the kindness
of a peasant who hides an old Jew in his barn. (108)
The National Conference is a national community experiencing dialogically that
kind of little goodness. The call to responsibility for the communicative silencer
to become responsive listener is a call to engage in the practice of little goodness
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as a communicative need for the strengthening of democracy. Here lies
specifically the limit of this call.
The metaphor of responsive listener should never lose sight of “the
impossibility of goodness as a government, as a social institution” (Levinas, 1999,
107). The idea of responsibility captured communicatively by the metaphor of
responsive listener belongs to a realm different from the writing of a constitution,
the institutional establishment of rights and duties, the official and procedural
deliberation required by democracy. While these dimensions of a democratic life
are necessary, they require along their side the existence in everyday life of “little
goodness that cannot be organized as government or social institution. If
democracy needs help, it is because its conception has been reduced to episodic
elections, voting machines, etc. The reinvention of democracy by every society in
every age that Barber calls for needs Levinas’s remainder that “any attempt to
organize human fails.” The communicative praxis of the responsive listener is a
little goodness that can be called for and pointed to, but that cannot be organized
or institutionalized. The call for responsive listening connects the communicative
praxis of the intellectual elite with the little goodness that made the National
Conference successful.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION: “POINTING THE WAY”
The interpretation of the participatory public dialogue in Benin unveils the
ethical necessity for communicative silencers to journey toward becoming
responsive listeners because the possibility of breaking the culture of silence and
constructing  a dialogic life depends heavily on it, although the broad
participations of many citizens becoming dialogic participants is a necessity as
well. Such understanding of participation points to the necessity of a constant
reinventing of democracy (Baber), particularly in a culture of silence.
The historic experience of the National Conference has proven to Benin and to
those countries that have at least at some point look up to Benin’s peaceful
transition as a model for political transition that the breaking of the culture of
silence is possible and democracy depends on silenced world being able to find a
posture to say its own word.
The limitations of the Conference widely discussed in the literature prove
how difficult it is to break through the culture of silence. As the interpretations of
the Conference has failed to understand the public dialogue that happened, the
aftermath of the Conference has been losing the possibility of continual invention
of the democracy as the initial pubic dialogue has made it possible. As a
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consequence, the democracy of Benin has become like any other struggling
democracy.
The interpretive listening attempts in this work hears the echo of the
“hidden” and point the way to an interpretation otherwise of democracy, of
responsibility, of public dialogue, of participatory communication.
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